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In the Quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory (or QBism), the Born Rule cannot be
interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum
state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as
an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born
Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into
account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements
on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities
consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This
interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities
for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We
further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the full
state-space structure of quantum mechanics.
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I. INTRODUCTION: UNPERFORMED
MEASUREMENTS HAVE NO OUTCOMES
We choose to examine a phenomenon which is im-
possible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any
classical way, and which has in it the heart of quan-
tum mechanics. In reality, it contains the only
mystery. We cannot make the mystery go away
by “explaining” how it works. We will just tell
you how it works. In telling you how it works we
will have told you about the basic peculiarities of
all quantum mechanics.
— R. P. Feynman, 1964
These words come from the opening chapter on quan-
tum mechanics in Richard Feynman’s famous Feynman
Lectures on Physics (Feynman, 1964). With them he
plunged into a discussion of the double-slit experiment
using individual electrons. Imagine if you will, however,
someone well-versed in the quantum foundations debates
of the last 30 years—since the Aspect experiment say
(Aspect, 1982)—yet naively unaware of when Feynman
wrote this. What might he conclude that Feynman was
talking about? Would it be the double-slit experiment?
Probably not. To the modern mindset, a good guess
would be that Feynman was talking about something to
do with quantum entanglement or Bell-inequality viola-
tions. In the history of foundational thinking, the double-
slit experiment has fallen by the wayside.
So, what is it that quantum entanglement teaches
us—via EPR-type considerations and Bell-inequality
violations—that the double-slit experiment does not? A
common answer is that quantum mechanics does not ad-
2mit a “local hidden variable” formulation.1 By this one
usually means the conjunction of two statements (Bell,
1964, 1981): 1) that experiments in one region of space-
time cannot instantaneously affect matters of fact at far
away regions of spacetime, and 2) that there exist “hid-
den variables” that in some way “explain” measured val-
ues or their probabilities. Bell-inequality violations imply
that one or the other or some combination of both these
statements fails. This, many would say, is the deepest
“mystery” of quantum mechanics.
This mystery has two sides. It seems the majority of
physicists who care about these things think it is locality
(condition 1 above) that has to be abandoned through
the force of the experimentally observed Bell-inequality
violations—i.e., they think there really are “spooky ac-
tions at a distance.”2 Yet, there is a minority that
thinks the abandonment of condition 2 is the more war-
ranted conclusion (D’Ariano, 2009; Demopoulos, 2008;
Mermin, 1999; Peres, 1978; Plotnitsky, 2006; Wheeler,
1982; Zeilinger, 1996; Zukowski, 2005). Among these are
the Quantum Bayesians (Appleby, 2005a,b; Caves, 2002,
2007; Fuchs, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2010,b, 2012; Mermin,
2012; Schack, 2001, 2003; Timpson, 2008).3 Giving up on
hidden variables implies in particular that measured val-
ues do not pre-exist the act of measurement. A measure-
ment does not merely “read off” the values, but enacts or
creates them by the process itself. In a slogan inspired by
Asher Peres (Peres, 1978), “unperformed measurements
1 Too quick and dirty, some would say (Norsen, 2006). However,
the conclusion drawn there—that a Bell inequality violation im-
plies the failure of locality, full stop—is based (in part) on taking
the EPR criterion of reality or variants of it as sacrosanct. As
will become clear in this paper, we do not take it so.
2 Indeed, it flavors almost everything they think of quantum me-
chanics, including the interpretation of the toy models they use
to better understand the theory. Take the recent flurry of work
on Popescu-Rohrlich boxes (Popescu, 1994). These are imagi-
nary devices that give rise to greater-than-quantum violations of
various Bell inequalities. Importantly, another common name for
these devices is the term “nonlocal boxes” (Barrett, 2005). Their
exact definition comes via the magnitude of a Bell-inequality
violation—which entails the non-pre-existence of values or a vio-
lation of locality or both—but the commonly used name opts
only to recognize nonlocality. They’re not called no-hidden-
variable boxes, for instance. The nomenclature is psychologically
telling.
3 For alternative developments of several Bayesian-inspired ideas
in quantum mechanics, see (Baez, 2003; Bub, 2011; Caticha,
2006; Goyal, 2008; Leifer, 2006, 2007, 2012; Mana, 2007;
Pitowsky, 2003, 2005; Rau, 2007; Srednicki, 2005; Warmuth,
2009; Youssef, 2001). We leave keep these citations separate
from the remark above because of various distinctions within
each from what we are calling Quantum Bayesianism—these dis-
tinctions range from 1) the particular strains of Bayesianism each
adopts, to 2) whether quantum mechanics is a generalized prob-
ability theory or rather simply an application within Bayesian
probability per se, to 3) the level of the agent’s involvement in
bringing about the outcomes of quantum measurements. There
are nonetheless sometimes striking kinships between the ideas of
these papers and the effort here, and the papers are well worth
studying.
have no outcomes.”
Among the various arguments the Quantum Bayesians
use to come to this conclusion, not least in importance is
a thoroughgoing personalist account of all probabilities
(Bernardo, 1994; de Finetti, 1931, 1990; Jeffrey, 2004;
Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954)—where the “all” in this
sentence includes probabilities for quantum measurement
outcomes and even the probability-1 assignments among
these (Caves, 2007). From the Quantum-Bayesian point
of view, this is the only sound interpretation of prob-
ability. Moreover, this move for quantum probabilities
frees up the quantum state from any objectivist obliga-
tions. In so doing it wipes out the mystery of quantum-
state-change at a distance (Einstein, 1951; Fuchs, 2000;
Timpson, 2008) and much of the mystery of wave func-
tion collapse as well (Fuchs, 2002, 2010b, 2013).
But what does all this have to do with Feynman?
Apparently Feynman too saw something of a truth in
the idea that “unperformed measurements have no out-
comes.” Yet, he did so because of considerations to do
with the double-slit experiment. Later in the lecture he
wrote,
Is it true, or is it not true that the electron
either goes through hole 1 or it goes through
hole 2? The only answer that can be given
is that we have found from experiment that
there is a certain special way that we have
to think in order that we do not get into in-
consistencies. What we must say (to avoid
making wrong predictions) is the following.
If one looks at the holes or, more accurately,
if one has a piece of apparatus which is capa-
ble of determining whether the electrons go
through hole 1 or hole 2, then one can say
that it goes either through hole 1 or hole 2.
But, when one does not try to tell which way
the electron goes, when there is nothing in
the experiment to disturb the electrons, then
one may not say that an electron goes either
through hole 1 or hole 2. If one does say that,
and starts to make any deductions from the
statement, he will make errors in the anal-
ysis. This is the logical tightrope on which
we must walk if we wish to describe nature
successfully.
Returning to the original quote, we are left with the feel-
ing that this is the very thing Feynman saw to be the
“basic peculiarity of all quantum mechanics.”
One should ask though, is his conclusion really com-
pelled by so simple a phenomenon as the double slit?
How could simple “interference” be so far-reaching in its
metaphysical implications? Water waves interfere and
there is no great mystery there. Most importantly, the
double-slit experiment is a story of measurement on a sin-
gle quantum system, whereas the story of EPR and Bell
is that of measurement on two seemingly disconnected
systems.
3Two systems are introduced for a good reason. With-
out the guarantee of arbitrarily distant parts within the
experiment—so that one can conceive of measurements
on one, and draw inferences about the other—what justi-
fication would one have to think that changing the condi-
tions of the experiment (from one slit closed to both slits
open) should not make a deep conceptual difference to
its analysis? Without such a guarantee for underwriting
a belief that some matter of fact stays constant in the
consideration of two experiments, one—it might seem—
would be quite justified in responding, “Of course, you
change an experiment, and you get a different probabil-
ity distribution arising from it. So what?” 4 For quite a
long time, the authors thought that Feynman’s logical
path from example to conclusion—a conclusion that we
indeed agree with—was simply unwarranted. The argu-
ment just does not seem to hold to the same stringent
standards as Bell-inequality analyses.
However, we have recently started to appreciate that
there may be something of substance in Feynman’s argu-
ment nonetheless. It is just not so easily seen without the
proper mindset. The key point is that the so-called “in-
terference” in the example is not in a material field—of
course it was never purported to be—but in something
so ethereal as probability itself (a logical, not a physi-
cal, construct). Most particularly, Feynman makes use
of a beautiful and novel move: He analyzes the probabil-
ities in an experiment that will be done in terms of the
probabilities from experiments that won’t be done. He
does not simply conditionalize the probabilities to the
two situations and let it go at that.5 Rather he tries to
see the probabilities in the two situations as functions of
each other. Not functions of a condition, but functions
(or at least relations) of each other. This is an impor-
tant point. There is no necessity that the world give a
relation between these probabilities, yet it does: Quan-
tum mechanics is what makes the link precise. Feynman
seems to have a grasp on the idea that the essence of the
quantum mechanical formalism is to provide a tool for
analyzing the factual in terms of a counterfactual.6
Here is the way Feynman put it in a paper titled,
“The Concept of Probability in Quantum Mechanics,”
4 This is a point Koopman (Koopman, 1957) and Ballentine
(Ballentine, 1986) seem happy to stop the discussion with. For
instance, Ballentine writes, “One is well advised to beware of
probability statements of the form, P (X), instead of P (X|C).
The second argument may be safely omitted only if the condi-
tional event or information is clear from the context, and only
if it is constant throughout the problem. This is not the case
in the double slit experiment. . . . We observe from experiment
that P (X|C3) 6= P (X|C1) + P (X|C2). This fact, however, has
no bearing on the validity of . . . probability theory.”
5 See Footnote 4 at least once again.
6 In his own case, he then develops the formalism of amplitudes to
mediate between the various probabilities, whereas in this paper
we will doggedly stick to probabilities, and only probabilities. It
is only his conceptual point that we want to develop, not his
technical apparatus.
(Feynman, 1951):
I should say, that in spite of the impli-
cation of the title of this talk the concept of
probability is not altered in quantummechan-
ics. When I say the probability of a certain
outcome of an experiment is p, I mean the
conventional thing, that is, if the experiment
is repeated many times one expects that the
fraction of those which give the outcome in
question is roughly p. I will not be at all con-
cerned with analyzing or defining this concept
in more detail, for no departure from the con-
cept used in classical statistics is required.
What is changed, and changed radically,
is the method of calculating probabilities.
Far be it from us to completely agree with everything
in this quote. For instance, the concept of “probability
as long-run frequency” is anathema to a Bayesian of any
variety (Good, 1983).7 And B. O. Koopman (Koopman,
1957) is surely right when he says,
Ever since the advent of modern quan-
tum mechanics in the late 1920’s, the idea has
been prevalent that the classical laws of prob-
ability cease, in some sense, to be valid in the
new theory. More or less explicit statements
to this effect have been made in large number
and by many of the most eminent workers in
the new physics.8 . . .
7 It is worth pointing out, however, that Feynman was not al-
ways consistently a frequentist in his thinking about probability.
For instance, in the Lectures on Physics, chapter I-6, it says
(Feynman, 1964)
An experimental physicist usually says that an
“experimentally determined” probability has an “er-
ror,” and writes
P (H) =
NH
N
± 1
2
√
N
.
There is an implication in such an expression that
there is a “true” or “correct” probability which could
be computed if we knew enough, and that the obser-
vation may be in “error” due to a fluctuation. There
is, however, no way to make such thinking logically
consistent. It is probably better to realize that the
probability concept is in a sense subjective, that it
is always based on uncertain knowledge, and that its
quantitative evaluation is subject to change as we ob-
tain more information.
8 In fact, Koopman is speaking directly of Feynman here. More-
over, both he and Ballentine (Ballentine, 1986) have criticized
Feynman on the same point: That with his choice of the word
“changed” in the last quote, Feynman implicates himself in not
recognizing that the conditions of the three contemplated exper-
iments are distinct and, hence, in not conditionalizing his prob-
abilities appropriately. Thus—Koopman and Ballentine say—it
is no wonder Feynman thinks he sees a violation of the laws of
4Such a thesis is surprising, to say the least,
to anyone holding more or less conventional
views regarding the positions of logic, prob-
ability, and experimental science: many of
us have been apt—perhaps too naively—to
assume that experiments can lead to conclu-
sions only when worked up by means of logic
and probability, whose laws seem to be on a
different level from those of physical science.
But there is a kernel of truth here that should not be dis-
missed in spite of Feynman’s diversion to frequentism and
his in-the-end undefensible choice of the word “changed.”
Paraphrasing Feynman,
The concept of probability is not altered
in quantum mechanics (it is personalistic
Bayesian probability). What is radical is
the recipe it gives for calculating new prob-
abilities from old.
For, quantum mechanics—we plan to show in this
paper—gives a resource that raw Bayesian probability
theory does not: It gives a rule for forming probabilities
for the outcomes of factualizable 9 experiments (experi-
ments that may actually be performed) from the proba-
bilities one assigns for the outcomes of a designated coun-
terfactual experiment (an experiment only imagined, and
though possible to do, never actually performed). So,
yes, unperformed measurements have no outcomes as
Peres expressed nicely; nonetheless, imagining their per-
formance can aid in analyzing the probabilities one ought
to assign for an experiment that may factually be per-
formed. Putting it more carefully than Feynman: Quan-
tum mechanics does not provide a radical change to the
method of calculating probabilities; it provides rather an
empirical addition to the laws of Bayesian probability.
In this paper, we offer a modernization and Bayesian-
ification of Feynman’s consideration by making intimate
use of a potential representation of quantum states10 un-
known in his time: It is one based on SICs or symmet-
ric informationally complete observables (Appleby, 2005,
probability. In the authors’ opinion however, Koopman and Bal-
lentine are hanging too much on the word “changed”—we rather
see it as an unfortunate choice of wording on Feynman’s part.
That he understood that the conditions are different in a deep
and inescapable way in the three contemplated experiments, we
feel, is documented well enough in the quote above from his 1964
lecture.
9 We coin this term because it stands as a better counterpoint to
the term “counterfactual” than the term “actualizable” seems
to. We also want to capture the following idea a little more
plainly: Both measurements being spoken of here are only poten-
tial measurements—it is just that one will always be considered
in the imaginary realm, whereas the other may one day become
a fact of the matter if it is actually performed.
10 We say “potential” because so far the representation has been
seen to exist only for finite dimensional quantum systems with
dimension ≤ 100. More will be said on this in Section III.
2007; Caves, 1999; Fuchs, 2004b; Renes, 2004; Zauner,
1999). The goal is to make it more transparent than ever
that the content of the Born Rule is not that it gives a
procedure for setting probabilities (from some indepen-
dent entity called “the quantum state”), but that it rep-
resents a “method of calculating probabilities,” new ones
from old.
That this must be the meaning of the Born Rule
more generally for Quantum Bayesianism has been ar-
gued from several angles by the authors before (Caves,
2007; Fuchs, 2013). For instance, in (Caves, 2007), we
put it this way:
We have emphasized that one of the ar-
guments often repeated to justify that quan-
tum-mechanical probabilities are objective,
rather than subjective, is that they are “de-
termined by physical law.” But, what can
this mean? Inevitably, what is being in-
voked is an idea that quantum states |ψ〉 have
an existence independent of the probabili-
ties they give rise to through the Born Rule,
p(i) = 〈ψ|Ei|ψ〉. From the Bayesian perspec-
tive, however, these expressions are not in-
dependent at all, and what we have argued
. . . is that quantum states are every bit as
subjective as any Bayesian probability. What
then is the role of the Born Rule? Can it be
dispensed with completely?
It seems no, it cannot be dispensed with,
even from the Bayesian perspective. But its
significance is different than in other devel-
opments of quantum foundations: The Born
Rule is not a rule for setting probabilities,
but rather a rule for transforming or relating
them.
For instance, take a complete set of d+ 1
observables Ok, k = 1, . . . , d+1, for a Hilbert
space of dimension d. Subjectively setting
probabilities for the d outcomes of each such
measurement uniquely determines a quantum
state |ψ〉 (via inverting the Born Rule). Thus,
as concerns probabilities for the outcomes of
any other quantum measurements, there can
be no more freedom. All further probabilities
are obtained through linear transformations
of the originals. In this way, the role of the
Born Rule can be seen as having something of
the flavor of Dutch-book coherence, but with
an empirical content added on top of bare,
law-of-thought probability theory: An agent
interacting with the quantum world would be
wise to adjust his probabilities for the out-
comes of various measurements to those of
quantum form if he wants to avoid devastat-
ing consequences. The role of physical law—
i.e., the assumption that the world is made
of quantum mechanical stuff—is codified in
how measurement probabilities are related,
5not how they are set.
What is new in the present paper is the emphasis on a sin-
gle designated observable for the counterfactual thinking,
as well as a detailed exploration of the rule for combining
probabilities in this picture. Particularly, we will see that
a significant part of the structure of quantum-state space
arises from the consistency of that rule—a single formula
we designate the urgleichung (German for “primal equa-
tion”). The urgleichung is the stand-in and correction in
our context for Feynman’s not-quite-right but nonethe-
less suggestive sentence, “What is changed, and changed
radically, is the method of calculating probabilities.”
Returning to the point we started our discussion with,
the one about interference going by the wayside in quan-
tum foundations, we should say the following. To the ex-
tent that the full formalism of quantum mechanics can be
re-derived from a simple Feynman-style scenario—even if
not the double-slit experiment per se, but nonetheless one
wherein probabilities for the outcomes of factualizable ex-
periments are obtained from probabilities in a family of
designated counterfactual ones—that scenario must in-
deed express the essence of quantum mechanics. For if
these considerations give rise to the full formalism of the
theory (Hilbert spaces, positive operators, the possibil-
ity of tensor-product decompositions, etc.), they must
give rise to entanglement, Bell-inequality violations, and
Kochen-Specker ‘paradoxes’ as well: These will be estab-
lished as corollaries to the formalism. Hidden in these
ostensibly different considerations would be every mys-
tery and every ‘paradox’ of quantum mechanics. And
if this is truly the case, who could say that the simple
scenario does not carry in it the essence of quantum me-
chanics? From our point of view, it goes without saying
that the exploration of quantum mechanics’ ability to
engender Bell-inequality violations and Kochen-Specker
theorems is an immensely instructive activity for sort-
ing out the implications of the theory. Nonetheless, one
should not lose sight of the potential loss of understand-
ing that can be incurred by confusing a corollary with a
postulate. In this sense, Feynman may well have had the
right intuition.
A. Outline of the Paper
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II,
we review the personalist Bayesian account of probabil-
ity, showing how some Dutch-book arguments work, and
emphasizing a point we have not seen emphasized be-
fore: Bayes’ rule and the Law of Total Probability, Eqs.
(1) and (3), are not necessities in a Bayesian account of
probability. These rules are enforceable when there is
a conditional lottery in the picture that can be gambled
upon. But when there is no such lottery, the rules hold no
force—without a conditional lottery there is nothing in
Dutch-book coherence itself that can be used to compel
the rules.
In Section III, we review the notion of a SIC (sym-
metric informationally complete observable), and show a
sense in which it is a very special measurement. Most
importantly we delineate the full structure of quantum-
state space in SIC terms. It turns out that, by making
use of a SIC instead of any other informationally com-
plete measurement, the formalism becomes uniquely sim-
ple and compact. We also show that unitary time evolu-
tion, when written in SIC terms, looks (formally at least)
almost identical to classical stochastic evolution.
Section IV contains the heart of the paper. In it, we
introduce the idea of thinking of an imaginary (counter-
factual) SIC behind all quantum measurements, so as to
give an imaginary conditional lottery with which to de-
fine conditional probabilities. We then show how to write
the Born Rule in these terms, and find it to appear strik-
ingly similar to the Law of Total Probability, Eq. (3). We
then note how this move in interpretation is radically dif-
ferent from the one offered by the followers of “objective
chance” in the Lewisian sense (Lewis, 1986a,b).
In Section V, we show that one can derive some of
the features of quantum-state space by taking this modi-
fied or Quantum Law of Total Probability as a postulate.
Particularly, we show that with a small number of further
assumptions, it gives rise to a generalized Bloch sphere
and seems to define an underlying “dimensionality” for
a system that matches the one given by its quantum me-
chanical state space. We also demonstrate other features
of the geometry these considerations give rise to.
In Section VI, we step back further in our considera-
tions and explore the extent to which the particular con-
stants d2, d + 1, and 1d in our Quantum Law of Total
Probability, Eq. (64), can arise from more elementary
considerations. This section is a preliminary attempt to
understand the origin of the equation treated simply as
a postulate in Section V.
In Section VII we give a brief discussion of where we
stand at this stage of research. Finally in Section VIII,
we close the paper by discussing how our work is still
far from done: Hilbert space, from a Quantum-Bayesian
view, has not yet been derived, only indicated. Nonethe-
less the progress made here gives us hope that we are
inching our way toward a formal expression of the ontol-
ogy underlying a Quantum-Bayesian vision of quantum
mechanics: It has to do with the Peres slogan “unper-
formed measurements have no outcomes,” but tempered
with a kind of ‘realism’ that he probably would not have
accepted forthrightly.11 On the other hand, it is not a
‘realism’ that we expect to be immediately accepted by
most modern philosophers of science either.12 This is be-
11 We say this because of Peres’s openly acknowledged positivist
tendencies. See Chapters 22 and 23 in (Fuchs, 2010) where Peres
would sometimes call himself a “recalcitrant positivist.” Also see
the opening remarks of (Peres, 2005) for a good laugh.
12 See (Dennett, 2004; Nagel, 1989; Price, 1997) for introductions to
the “view from nowhere” and“view from nowhen” weltanschau-
6cause it is already clear that whatever it will ultimately
turn out to be, it is based on a) a rejection of the ontology
of the block universe (James, 1882, 1884, 1910), and b) a
rejection of the ontology of the detached observer (Gieser,
2005; Laurikainen, 1988; Pauli, 1994). The ‘realism’ in
vogue in philosophy-of-science circles, which makes heavy
use of both these elements, is, as Wolfgang Pauli once
said, “too narrow a concept” for our purposes (Pauli,
1994). Reality, the stuff of which the world is made, the
stuff that was here before agents and observers, is more
interesting than that.
II. PERSONALIST BAYESIAN PROBABILITY
From the Bayesian point of view, probability is degree
of belief as measured by action. More precisely, we say
one has (explicitly or implicitly) assigned a probability
p(A) to an event A if, before knowing the value of A, one
is willing to either buy or sell a lottery ticket of the form
Worth $1 if A.
for an amount $p(A).13 The personalist Bayesian posi-
tion adds only that this is the full meaning of probability;
it is nothing more and nothing less than this definition.
Particularly, nothing intrinsic to the event or proposition
A can help declare p(A) right or wrong, or more or less
rational. The value p(A) is solely a statement about the
agent who assigns it.
Nonetheless, even for a personalist Bayesian, proba-
bilities do not wave in the wind. Probabilities are held
together by a normative principle: That whenever an
agent declares probabilities for various events—say A,
¬B (“not B”), A ∨ B (“A or B”), A ∧ C (“A and C”),
etc.—he should strive to never gamble (i.e., buy and sell
lottery tickets) so as to incur what he believes will be a
sure loss. This normative principle is known as Dutch-
book coherence. And from it, one can derive the usual
calculus of probability theory.
This package of views about probability (that in value
it is personal, but that in function it is akin to the laws
of logic) had its origin in the mid-1920s and early 1930s
with the work of F. P. Ramsey (Ramsey, 1931) and B.
de Finetti (de Finetti, 1931). J. M. Keynes characterizes
Ramsey’s position succinctly (Keynes, 1951):
[Ramsey] succeeds in showing that the calcu-
lus of probabilities simply amounts to a set
ungen.
13 In other words, the personalist Bayesian agent regards $p(A)
as the fair price of the lottery ticket. He would regard it as
advantageous to buy it for any price less than $p(A), or to sell
it for any price greater than $p(A).
of rules for ensuring that the system of de-
grees of belief which we hold shall be a con-
sistent system. Thus the calculus of proba-
bilities belongs to formal logic. But the basis
of our degrees of belief—or the a priori, as
they used to be called—is part of our human
outfit, perhaps given us merely by natural se-
lection, analogous to our perceptions and our
memories rather than to formal logic.
And B. O. Koopman writes (Koopman, 1940):
The intuitive thesis in probability holds
that both in its meanings and in the laws
which it obeys, probability derives directly
from the intuition, and is prior to objective
experience; it holds that it is for experience
to be interpreted in terms of probability and
not for probability to be interpreted in terms
of experience . . .
Let us go through some of the derivation of the prob-
ability calculus from Dutch-book coherence so that we
may better make a point concerning quantum mechanics
afterward.14 First we establish that our normative princi-
ple requires 0 ≤ P (A) ≤ 1. For suppose P (A) < 0. This
means an agent will sell a ticket for negative money—
i.e., he will pay someone $p(A) to take the ticket off his
hands. Regardless of whether A occurs or not, the agent
will then be sure he will lose money. This violates the
normative principle. Now, take the case P (A) > 1. This
means the agent will buy a ticket for more than it is
worth even in the best case—again a sure loss for him
and a violation of the normative principle. So, probabil-
ity in the sense of ticket pricing should obey the usual
range of values.
Now let us establish the probability sum rule. Suppose
our agent believes two events A and B to be mutually
exclusive—i.e., he is sure that if A occurs, B will not,
or if B occurs, A will not. We can contemplate three
distinct lottery tickets:
Worth $1 if A ∨B.
and
Worth $1 if A. Worth $1 if B.
14 Here we basically follow the development in Richard Jeffrey’s
posthumously published book Subjective Probability, The Real
Thing (Jeffrey, 2004; Skyrms, 1987), but with our own emphasis.
7Clearly the value of the first ticket should be the same as
the total value of the other two. For instance, suppose
an agent had set P (A ∨ B), P (A) and P (B) such that
P (A ∨ B) > P (A) + P (B). Then—by definition—when
confronted with a seller of the first ticket, he must be
willing to buy it, and when confronted with a buyer of
the other two tickets, he must be willing to sell them. But
then the agent’s initial balance sheet would be negative:
−$P (A∨B)+$P (A)+$P (B) < $0. And whether A or B
or neither event occurs, it would not improve his finances:
If a dollar flows in (because of the bought ticket), it will
also flow out (because of the agent’s responsibilities for
the sold tickets), and still the balance sheet is negative.
The agent is sure of a loss. A similar argument goes
through if the agent had set his ticket prices so that P (A∨
B) < P (A) + P (B). Thus whatever values are set, the
normative principle prescribes that it had better be the
case that P (A ∨B) = P (A) + P (B).
Consider now the following lottery ticket of a slightly
different structure:
Worth $mn if A.
where m ≤ n are integers. Does Dutch-book coherence
say anything about the value of this ticket in comparison
to the value of the standard ticket—i.e., one worth $1 if
A? It does. An argument quite like the one above dic-
tates that it should be valued $mn P (A). If a real number
α were in place of the mn a similar result follows from a
limiting argument.
Now we come to the most interesting and important
case. Bayesian probability is not called by its name for
lack of a good reason. A key rule in probability theory is
Bayes’ rule relating joint to conditional probabilities:
p(A ∧B) = p(A)p(B|A) . (1)
Like the rest of the structure of probability theory within
the Bayesian conception, this rule must arise from an ap-
plication of Dutch-book coherence. What is that appli-
cation?
The only way anyone has seen how to do it is to in-
troduce the idea of a conditional lottery (Kyburg, 1980).
In such a lottery, the value of the event A is revealed to
the agent first. If A obtains, the lottery proceeds to the
revelation of event B, and finally all monies are settled
up. If on the other hand ¬A obtains, the remainder of
the lottery is called off, and the monies put down for any
“conditional tickets” are returned. That is to say, the
meaning of p(B|A) is taken to be the price $p(B|A) at
which one is willing to buy or sell a lottery ticket of the
following form:
Worth $1 if A ∧B. But return price if ¬A.
for price $p(B|A) . Explicitly inserting the definition of
p(B|A), this becomes:
Worth $1 if A ∧B. But return $p(B|A) if ¬A.
Now comes the coherence argument. For, if you think
about it, the price for this ticket had better be the same
as the total price for these two tickets:
Worth $1 if A ∧B.
Worth $p(B|A) if ¬A.
That is to say, to guard against a sure loss, we must have
p(B|A) = p(A ∧B) + p(B|A)p(¬A)
= p(A ∧B) + p(B|A) − p(B|A)p(A) . (2)
Consequently, Eq. (1) should hold whenever there is a
conditional lottery under consideration.
A. When a Conditional Lottery Is Not Without
Consequence
But what if the conditional lottery is called off because
the draw that was to give rise to the event A does not
take place? In this case the probabilities p(A) and p(B|A)
refer to a counterfactual, and there is no reason to assume
the validity of Eq. (1).
It is worth investigating the idea of counterfactuals in
some more detail. Suppose an agent makes a measure-
ment of a variable X that takes on values x, followed by
a measurement of a variable Y with mutually exclusive
values y. A Dutch bookie asks him to commit on vari-
ous unconditional and conditional lottery tickets. What
can we say of the probabilities he ought to ascribe? A
minor variation of the Dutch-book arguments above tells
us that whatever values of p(x), p(y), and p(y|x) he com-
mits to, they ought—if he is coherent—satisfy the Law
of Total Probability:
p(y) =
∑
x
p(x)p(y|x) . (3)
Imagine now that the X measurement is called off, so
there will only be the Y measurement. Is the agent still
normatively committed to buying and selling Y -lottery
tickets for the price $p(y) in Eq. (3) that he originally
expressed? Not at all! That would clearly be silly in
8some situations, and no clear-headed Bayesian would ever
imagine otherwise. The action bringing about the result
of the X measurement might so change the situation for
bringing about Y that he simply would not gamble on
it in the same way. To hold fast to the $p(y) valuation
of a Y -lottery ticket, then, is not a necessity enforced by
coherence, but a judgment that might or might not be
the right thing to do.
In fact, one might regard holding fast to the initial
value $p(y) in spite of the nullification of the conditional
lottery as the formal definition of precisely what it means
to judge an unperformed measurement to have an out-
come. It means one judges that looking at the value of X
is incidental to the whole affair, and this is reflected in the
way one gambles on Y (Fuchs, 2012). So, if q(y) repre-
sents the probabilities with which the agent gambles sup-
posing the X-lottery nullified, then a formal statement
of the Peresian slogan that the unperformed X measure-
ment had no outcome (i.e., measuring X matters, and
it matters even if one makes no note of the outcome) is
that
q(y) 6= p(y) . (4)
Still, one might imagine situations in which even if
an agent judges that equality does not hold for them,
he nonetheless judges that q(y) and p(y) should bear a
precise relation to each other. In Section IV, we will show
that, in fact, the positive content of the Born Rule as an
addition to Bayesianism is to connect the probabilities for
two measurements, one factual and one counterfactual,
for which Dutch-book coherence alone does not provide
a precise relationship.
III. EXPRESSING QUANTUM-STATE SPACE IN TERMS
OF SICS
Let Hd be a finite d-dimensional Hilbert space associ-
ated with some physical system. A quantum state for the
system is usually expressed as a unit-trace positive semi-
definite linear operator ρ ∈ L(Hd) . However, through
the use of a symmetric informationally complete observ-
able (or SIC) as a reference observable, we can find a
rather elegant representation of quantum states directly
in terms of an associated set of probability distributions.
A SIC is an example of a generalized measurement or
positive operator-valued measure (POVM) (Peres, 1993).
A POVM is a collection {Ei}, i = 1, . . . , n, of positive
semi-definite operators Ei on Hd such that∑
i
Ei = I , (5)
where n is in general unrelated to d and may be larger
or smaller than d. Supposing a quantum state ρ, the
probability of the measurement outcome labeled i is then
given by
p(i) = tr ρEi . (6)
FIG. 1 The planar surface represents the convex set of all
probability distributions over d2 outcomes—the probability
simplex ∆d2 . The probability distributions valid for repre-
senting the set of quantum states, however, is a smaller con-
vex set within the simplex—here depicted as an ellipsoid. In
actual fact, however, the convex shape is quite complex. The
choice of a SIC for defining the mapping makes the shape as
simple as it can be with respect to the natural geometry of
the simplex.
The POVMs represent the most general kinds of quan-
tum measurement that can be made on a system. A von
Neumann measurement is a special POVM where the Ei
are mutually orthogonal projection operators. Mathe-
matically, any POVM can be written as a unitary in-
teraction with an ancillary quantum system, followed by
a von Neumann measurement on the ancillary system
(Nielsen, 2000).
We can provide an injective mapping between the con-
vex set of density operators and the set of probability
distributions15
‖p〉〉 =
(
p(1), p(2), . . . , p(d2)
)T
(7)
over d2 outcomes—the probability simplex ∆d2—by first
fixing any so-called minimal informationally complete
fiducial measurement {Ei}, i = 1, . . . , d2. This is a
POVM with all the Ei linearly independent. With re-
spect to such a measurement, the probabilities p(i) for
its outcomes completely specify ρ. This follows because
the Ei form a basis for L(Hd), and the probabilities
p(i) = tr ρEi can be viewed as instances of the Hilbert-
15 Please note our pseudo-Dirac notation ‖v〉〉 for vectors in a real
vector space of d2 dimensions. The relevant probability simplex
for us—the one we are mapping quantum states ρ to, denoted
∆d2—is a convex body within this linear vector space. Thus,
its points may be expressed with the notation ‖p〉〉 as well. The
choice of a pseudo-Dirac notation for probability distributions
also emphasizes that one should think of the valid ‖p〉〉 as a direct
expression of the set of quantum states.
9Schmidt inner product
(A,B) = trA†B . (8)
The quantities p(i) thus merely express the projections of
the vector ρ onto the basis vectors Ei. These projections
completely fix the vector ρ.
One can see how to calculate ρ in terms of the vector
‖p〉〉 in the following way. Since the Ei form a basis, there
must be some expansion
ρ =
∑
αjEj , (9)
where the αj are real numbers making up a vector ‖α〉〉.
Thus,
p(i) =
∑
j
αj trEiEj . (10)
If we let a matrix M be defined by entries
Mij = trEiEj , (11)
this just becomes
‖p〉〉 =M‖α〉〉 . (12)
Using the fact that M is invertible because the Ei are
linearly independent, we have finally
‖α〉〉 =M−1‖p〉〉 . (13)
The most important point of this exercise is that with
such a mapping established, one has every right to think
of a quantum state as a probability distribution full stop.
In (Fuchs, 2002) it is argued that, conceptually, it is in-
deed nothing more. However, it is important to note
that the mapping ρ 7→ ‖p〉〉, though injective, cannot be
surjective. In other words, only some probability distri-
butions in the simplex are valid for representing quantum
states. A significant part of understanding quantum me-
chanics is understanding the range of shapes available
under these mappings (Bengtsson, 2006).
Particularly, it is important to recognize that informa-
tionally complete measurements abound—they come in
all forms and sizes. Hence there is no unique represen-
tation of this variety for quantum states. A reasonable
question thus follows: What is the best measurement one
can use for a mapping ρ 7→ ‖p〉〉 ? One would not want
to unduly burden the representation with extra terms
and calculations if one does not have to. For instance, it
would be beautiful if one could take the informationally
complete measurement {Ei} so that M is simply a diag-
onal matrix or even the identity matrix itself. Such an
extreme simplification, however, is not in the cards—it
cannot be done.
Its failure does, however, point to an interesting di-
rection worthy of development: If one cannot make M
diagonal, one might still want to make M as close to the
identity as possible. A convenient measure for how far
M is from the identity is the squared Frobenius distance:
F =
∑
ij
(
δij −Mij
)2
=
∑
i
(
1− trE2i
)2
+
∑
i6=j
(
trEiEj
)2
. (14)
We can place a lower bound on this quantity with the
help of a special instance of the Schwarz inequality: If λr
is any set of n nonnegative numbers, then
∑
r
λ2r ≥
1
n
(∑
r
λr
)2
, (15)
with equality if and only if λ1 = . . . = λn. Thus,
F ≥ 1
d2
(∑
i
(
1− trE2i
))2
+
1
d4 − d2

∑
i6=j
trEiEj


2
. (16)
Equality holds in this if and only if there are constants
m and n such that trE2i = m for all i and trEiEj = n
for all i 6= j. Since
d = tr I2 =
∑
ij
trEiEj =
∑
i
trE2i +
∑
i6=j
trEiEj , (17)
m and n must be related by
m+ (d2 − 1)n = 1
d
. (18)
On the other hand, with these conditions fulfilled the Ei
must all have the same trace. For,
trEk =
∑
i
trEkEi = m+ (d
2 − 1)n . (19)
Consequently
trEk =
1
d
. (20)
Now, how large can m be? Take a positive semi-definite
matrix A with trA = 1 and eigenvalues λi. Then λi ≤ 1,
and clearly trA2 ≤ trA with equality if and only if the
largest λi is equal to 1. Hence, dEk will give the largest
allowed value m if Ei =
1
dΠi, where
Πi = |ψi〉〈ψi| , (21)
for some rank-1 projection operator Πi. If this obtains,
n takes the form
n =
1
d2(d+ 1)
. (22)
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In total we have shown that a measurement {Ei}, i =
1, . . . , d2, will achieve the best lower bound for F if and
only if
Ei =
1
d
Πi (23)
with
tr ΠiΠj =
dδij + 1
d+ 1
. (24)
Significantly, it turns out that measurements of this
variety also have the property of being necessarily infor-
mationally complete (Caves, 1999). Let us show this for
completeness: It is just a matter of proving that the Ei
are linearly independent. Suppose there are some num-
bers αi such that ∑
i
αiEi = 0 . (25)
Taking the trace of this equation, we infer that
∑
i αi =
0. Now multiply Eq. (25) by an arbitrary Ek and take
the trace of the result. We get,
1
d2
∑
i
αi
dδik + 1
d+ 1
= 0 . (26)
In other words ∑
i
αiδik = 0 , (27)
which of course implies αk = 0. So the Ei are linearly
independent.
These kinds of measurements are presently a hot topic
of study in quantum information theory, and have come
to be known as “symmetric informationally complete”
quantum measurements (Caves, 1999). As such, the mea-
surement {Ei}, the associated set of projection operators
{Πi}, and even the set of {|ψi〉} are often simply called
SIC (pronounced “seek”).16 We will adopt that termi-
nology here.
Here is an example of a SIC in dimension-2, expressed
in terms of the Pauli operators:
Π1 =
1
2
(
I +
1√
3
(σx + σy + σz)
)
,
Π2 =
1
2
(
I +
1√
3
(σx − σy − σz)
)
,
Π3 =
1
2
(
I +
1√
3
(−σx − σy + σz)
)
,
Π4 =
1
2
(
I +
1√
3
(−σx + σy − σz)
)
. (28)
16 This choice of pronunciation is meant to be in accord with
the “pedant’s pronunciation” of the Latin adverb sic (Bennett,
2008). Moreover, it alleviates any potential confusion between
the pluralized form SICs and the number six in conversation.
And here is an example of a SIC in dimension-3 (Tabia,
2012). Taking ω = e2πi/3 to be a third-root of unity and
ω to be its complex conjugate, let
|ψ1〉 =

 01
−1

, |ψ2〉 =

−10
1

, |ψ3〉 =

 1−1
0


|ψ4〉 =

 0ω
−ω

, |ψ5〉 =

−10
ω

, |ψ6〉 =

 1−ω
0


|ψ7〉 =

 0ω
−ω

, |ψ8〉 =

−10
ω

, |ψ9〉 =

 1−ω
0


(29)
be defined up to normalization. One can check by quick
inspection that (after normalization) these vectors do in-
deed satisfy Eq. (24).
Do SICs exist for every finite dimension d? Despite
many efforts in the last 14 years—see (Appleby, 2005,
2007; Caves, 1999; Fuchs, 2004b; Renes, 2004; Zauner,
1999) and particularly the extensive reference lists in
(Scott, 2010) and (Appleby, 2012)—no one presently
knows. However, there is a strong feeling in the com-
munity that they do, as analytical proofs have been ob-
tained for all dimensions d = 2–16, 19, 24, 28, 31, 35, 37,
43, and 48,17 and within a numerical precision of 10−38,
they have been observed by computational means (Scott,
2010) in all dimensions d = 2–67. To lesser numerical
precision E. Schnetter has also found SICs in d = 68–73,
75–81, 83, 84, 89, 93, 100 (Schnetter, 2012).
The SIC structure is ideal for revealing the essence of
the Born Rule as an addition to Dutch-book coherence.
From here out, we will proceed as if SICs do indeed al-
ways exist. The foundational significance of the following
technical development rests on this mathematical conjec-
ture.
Let us spell out in some detail what the set of quantum
states written as SIC probability vectors ‖p〉〉 looks like.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about a SIC is the
level of simplicity it lends to Eq. (13). On top of the
theoretical justification that SICs are as near as possible
to an orthonormal basis, from Eqs. (6), (23) and (24) one
gets the simple expression (Caves, 2002b; Fuchs, 2004b)
ρ =
∑
i
(
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
)
Πi . (30)
In other words, effectively all explicit reference to the
matrix M−1 disappears from the expression. The com-
17 Dimensions 2–5 were published in (Zauner, 1999). Dimensions 6–
16, 24, 28, 35, and 48 are due to M. Grassl in various publications;
see (Scott, 2010). Dimensions 7, 19, 31, 37, and 43 are due to D.
M. Appleby, with the latter three as yet unpublished (Appleby,
2012).
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ponents (d+1)p(i)− 1d are obtained by a universal scalar
readjustment from the probabilities p(i). This will have
important implications.
Still, one cannot place just any probability distribution
p(i) into Eq. (30) and expect to obtain a positive semi-
definite ρ. Only some probability vectors ‖p〉〉 are valid
ones. Which ones are they? For instance, p(i) ≤ 1d must
be the case, as dictated by Eqs. (6) and (20), and this al-
ready restricts the class of valid probability assignments.
But there are more requirements than that.
In preparation for characterizing the set of valid prob-
ability vectors ‖p〉〉, let us note that since the Πk form
a basis on the space of operators, we can define oper-
ator multiplication in terms of them. This is done by
introducing the so-called structure coefficients αijk for
the algebra:
ΠiΠj =
∑
k
αijkΠk . (31)
A couple of properties follow immediately. Taking the
trace of both sides of Eq. (31), one has
∑
k
αijk =
d δij + 1
d+ 1
. (32)
Using this, one gets straightforwardly that
tr
(
ΠiΠjΠk
)
=
1
d+ 1
(
dαijk +
d δij + 1
d+ 1
)
. (33)
In other words,
αijk =
1
d
(
(d+ 1)tr
(
ΠiΠjΠk
)
− d δij + 1
d+ 1
)
. (34)
For the analogue of Eq. (32) but with summation over
the first or second index, one gets,∑
i
αijk = dδjk and
∑
j
αijk = dδik . (35)
With these expressions in hand, one sees a very direct
connection between the structure of the algebra of quan-
tum states when written in operator language and the
structure of quantum states when written in probability-
vector language. For, the complete convex set of quan-
tum states is fixed by the set of its extreme points, i.e.,
the pure quantum states—rank-1 projection operators.
To characterize this set algebraically, one method is to
note that these are the only hermitian operators satisfy-
ing ρ2 = ρ. Using Eq. (30), we find that a quantum state
‖p〉〉 is pure if and only if its components satisfy these d2
simultaneous quadratic equations:
p(k) =
1
3
(d+ 1)
∑
ij
αijk p(i)p(j) +
2
3d(d+ 1)
. (36)
Another way to characterize this algebraic variety—an
algebraic variety is defined as the set of solutions of a
system of polynomial equations—is to make use of a the-
orem of Flammia, Jones, and Linden (Flammia, 2004;
Jones, 2005): A hermitian operator A is a rank-one pro-
jection operator if and only if trA2 = trA3 = 1.18 So
in fact our d2 simultaneous quadratic equations reduce
to just two equations instead, one a quadratic and one a
cubic:
∑
i
p(i)2 =
2
d(d+ 1)
(37)
and
∑
ijk
αijk p(i)p(j)p(k) =
4
d(d+ 1)2
. (38)
Note that Eqs. (36) and (38) are complex equations, but
one could symmetrize them and make them purely real
if one wanted to.
There are also some advantages to working out these
equations more explicitly in terms of the completely sym-
metric 3-index tensor
cijk = Re tr
(
ΠiΠjΠk
)
. (39)
In terms of these quantities, the analogues of Eqs. (36)
and (38) become
p(k) =
(d+ 1)2
3d
∑
ij
cijk p(i)p(j)− 1
3d
(40)
and
∑
ijk
cijk p(i)p(j)p(k) =
d+ 7
(d+ 1)3
, (41)
respectively. The reason for noting this comes from
the simplicity of the d2 matrices Ck with matrix entries
(Ck)ij = cijk from Eq. (39), which is explored in great
detail in (Appleby, 2011). To give a flavor of the results,
we note for instance that, for each value of k, Ck turns
out to have the form (Appleby, 2011)
Ck = ‖mk〉〉〈〈mk‖+ d
2(d+ 1)
Qk , (42)
18 The theorem is nearly trivial to prove once one’s attention is
drawn to it: Since A is hermitian, it has a real eigenvalue spec-
trum λi. From the first condition, one has that
∑
i λ
2
i = 1;
from the second,
∑
i λ
3
i = 1. The first condition, however, im-
plies that |λi| ≤ 1 for all i. Consequently 1 − λi ≥ 0 for all i.
Now taking the difference of the two conditions, one sees that∑
i λ
2
i (1 − λi) = 0. In order for this to obtain, it must be the
case that λi is always 0 or 1 exclusively. That there is only one
nonzero eigenvalue then follows from using the first condition
again. Thus the theorem is proved. However, it seems not to
have been widely recognized previous to 2004–2005.
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where the k-th vector ‖mk〉〉 is defined by
‖mk〉〉 =
(
1
d+ 1
, . . . , 1, . . . ,
1
d+ 1
)T
, (43)
and Qk is a (2d− 2)-dimensional projection operator on
the real vector space embedding the probability simplex
∆d2 . Furthermore, using this, one obtains a useful ex-
pression for the pure states; they are probabilities satis-
fying a simple class of quadratic equations
p(k) = d p(k)2 +
1
2
(d+ 1)〈〈p‖Qk‖p〉〉 . (44)
With Eqs. (37), (40), and (41) we have now discussed
the extreme points of the convex set of quantum states—
the pure states. The remainder of the set of quantum
states is then constructed by taking convex combina-
tions of the pure states. This is an implicit expression
of quantum-state space. But SICs can also help give an
explicit parameterization of the convex set.
We can see this by starting not with density operators,
but with “square roots” of density operators. This is
useful because a matrix ρ is positive semi-definite if and
only if it can be written as ρ = B2 for some hermitian
B. Thus, let
B =
∑
i
biΠi (45)
with bi a set of real numbers. Then,
ρ =
∑
k

∑
ij
bibjαijk

Πk (46)
will represent a density operator so long as tr ρ = 1. This
condition requires simply that(∑
i
bi
)2
+ d
∑
i
b2i = d+ 1 , (47)
so that the vectors (b1, . . . , bd2) lie on the surface of an
ellipsoid.
Putting these ingredients together with Eq. (6), we
have the following parameterization of valid probability
vectors ‖p〉〉:
p(k) =
1
d
∑
ij
cijkbibj . (48)
Here the cijk are the triple-product constants defined in
Eq. (39) and the bi satisfy the constraint (47).
Finally, let us note what the Hilbert-Schmidt inner
product of two quantum states looks like in SIC terms.
If a quantum state ρ is mapped to ‖p〉〉 via a SIC, and a
quantum state σ is mapped to ‖q〉〉, then
tr ρσ = d(d+ 1)
∑
i
p(i)q(i)− 1
= d(d+ 1)〈〈p‖q〉〉 − 1 . (49)
Notice a particular consequence of this: Since tr ρσ ≥ 0,
the distributions associated with distinct quantum states
can never be too nonoverlapping:
〈〈p‖q〉〉 ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
. (50)
With this development we have given a broad outline
of the shape of quantum-state space in SIC terms. We
do this because that shape is our target. Particularly,
we are obliged to answer the following question: If one
takes the view that quantum states are nothing more
than probability distributions with the restrictions (48)
and (47), what could motivate that restriction? That is,
what could motivate it other than knowing the usual for-
malism for quantum mechanics? The answer has to do
with rewriting the Born Rule in terms of SICs, which we
will do in Section IV.
A. Aside on Unitarity
Let us take a moment to move beyond statics and
rewrite quantum dynamics in SIC terms: We do this be-
cause the result will have a striking resemblance to the
Born Rule itself, once developed in the next section.
Suppose we start with a density operator ρ and let it
evolve under unitary time evolution to a new density op-
erator σ = UρU †. If ρ has a representation p(i) with
respect to a certain given SIC, σ will have a SIC repre-
sentation as well—let us call it q(j). We use the different
index j (contrasting with i) to help indicate that we are
talking about the quantum system at a later time than
the original.
What is the form of the mapping that takes ‖p〉〉 to
‖q〉〉? It is simple enough to find with the help of Eqs. (23)
and (30):
q(j) =
1
d
trσΠj
=
1
d
∑
i
(
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
)
tr
(
UΠiU
†Πj
)
.
(51)
If we now define
rU(j|i) = 1
d
tr
(
UΠiU
†Πj
)
(52)
and remember, e.g., Eq. (21), we have that
0 ≤ rU(j|i) ≤ 1 (53)
and∑
j
rU(j|i) = 1 ∀i and
∑
i
rU(j|i) = 1 ∀j .
(54)
In other words, the d2 × d2 matrix [ rU(j|i) ] is a doubly
stochastic matrix (Horn, 1985).
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Most importantly, one has
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)rU(j|i)− 1
d
. (55)
Without the (d+1) factor and the 1d term, this equation
would represent classical stochastic evolution. Unitary
time evolution in a SIC representation is thus formally
close to classical stochastic evolution. As we shall shortly
see, this teaches us something about unitarity and its
connection to the Born Rule itself.
IV. EXPRESSING THE BORN RULE IN TERMS OF SICS
In this section we come to the heart of the paper: We
rewrite the Born Rule in terms of SICs. It is easy enough;
we just use the expansion in Eq. (30). Let us first do
it for an arbitrary von Neumann measurement—that is,
any measurement specified by a set of rank-1 projection
operators Pj = |j〉〈j|, j = 1, . . . , d. Expressing the Born
Rule the usual way, we obtain these probabilities for the
measurement outcomes:
q(j) = tr ρPj . (56)
Then, by defining
r(j|i) = trΠiPj , (57)
one sees that the Born Rule becomes
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)− 1 . (58)
Let us take a moment to seek out a good interpre-
tation of this equation. It should be viewed as a direct
expression of the considerations laid out in Section II. For
imagine that before performing the Pj measurement—we
will call it the “measurement on the ground”—we were
to perform a SIC measurement Πi. We will call the latter
the “measurement in the sky.”
Starting with an initial quantum state ρ, we would as-
sign a probability distribution p(i) to the outcomes of the
SIC measurement. In order to be able to say something
about probabilities conditional on a particular outcome
of the SIC measurement, we need to specify the post-
measurement quantum state for that outcome. Here we
will adopt the standard Lu¨ders Rule (Busch, 1995, 2009),
that ρ transforms to Πi when outcome i occurs. The
conditional probability for getting j in the subsequent
von Neumann measurement on the ground, consequent
upon i, is then precisely r(j|i) as defined in Eq. (57).
With these assignments, Dutch-book coherence demands
an assignment s(j) for the outcomes on the ground that
satisfies
s(j) =
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i) , (59)
q(j)
factual
counterfactual
co
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
al
p(i)
r(j|i)
j
i
i=1,2,...,n
j=1,2,...,m
sky (fixed)
(arbitrary)
ground
FIG. 2 The diagram above expresses the basic conceptual ap-
paratus of this paper. The measurement on the ground, with
outcomes j = 1, . . . ,m, is some potential measurement that
could be performed in the laboratory—i.e., one that could
be factualized. The measurement in the sky, on the other
hand, with outcomes i = 1, . . . , n, is a fixed measurement
one can contemplate independently. The probability distri-
butions p(i) and r(j|i) represent how an agent would gam-
ble if a conditional lottery based on the measurement in the
sky were operative. The probability distribution q(j) repre-
sents instead how the agent would gamble on outcomes of the
ground measurement if the measurement in the sky and the
associated conditional lottery were nullified—i.e., they were
to never take place at all. In the quantum case, the mea-
surement in the sky is a SIC with n = d2 outcomes; the
measurement on the ground is any POVM. In pure Bayesian
reasoning, there is no necessity that q(j) be related to p(i)
and r(j|i) at all. In quantum mechanics, however, there is a
very specific relation:
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)−
1
d
d2∑
i=1
r(j|i) .
This equation contains the sum content of the Born Rule, to
which it is equivalent.
i.e., a probability that comes about via the Law of Total
Probability, Eq. (3).
But now imagine the measurement in the sky
nullified—i.e., imagine it does not occur after all—and
that the quantum system goes directly to the measure-
ment device on the ground. Quantum mechanics tells us
to make the probability assignment q(j) given in Eq. (58)
instead. So,
q(j) = (d+ 1)s(j)− 1 . (60)
That q(j) 6= s(j) holds, regardless of the assignment of
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s(j), is a formal expression of the idea that the “unper-
formed SIC had no outcomes,” as explained in Sec. II.A.
But Eq. (60) tells us still more detailed information
than this. It expresses a kind of “empirically extended
coherence”—not implied by Dutch-book coherence alone,
but formally similar to the kind of relation one gets from
Dutch-book coherence. It contains a surprising amount
of information about the structure of quantum mechan-
ics.
To support this, let us try to glean some insight from
Eq. (60). The most obvious thing one can note is that
‖s〉〉 cannot be too sharp a probability distribution. For
otherwise q(j) will violate the bounds 0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1 set
by Dutch-book coherence. Particularly,
1
d+ 1
≤ s(j) ≤ 2
d+ 1
. (61)
This in turn will have implications for the range of values
possible for p(i) and r(j|i). Indeed if either of these dis-
tributions become too sharp (in the latter case, for too
many values of i), again the bounds will be violated. This
suggests that an essential part of quantum-state space
structure, as expressed by its extreme points satisfying
Eqs. (37) and (38), arises from the very requirement that
q(j) be a proper probability distribution. In the next
Section, we will explore this question in greater depth.
First though, we must note the most general form of
the Born Rule, when the measurement on the ground
is not restricted to being of the simple von Neumann
variety. So, let
q(j) = tr ρFj (62)
and
r(j|i) = trΠiFj (63)
for some general POVM {Fj} on the ground, with any
number of outcomes, j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the Born Rule
becomes
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)− 1
d
d2∑
i=1
r(j|i) . (64)
As stated, this is the most general form of the Quan-
tum Law of Total Probability. It has two terms, a term
comprising the classical Law of Total Probability, and
a term dependent only upon the sum of the conditional
probabilities.
When the measurement on the ground is itself another
SIC (any SIC) it reduces to
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i) − 1
d
. (65)
Notice the formal resemblance between this and Eq. (55)
expressing unitary time evolution.
A. Why “Empirically Extended Coherence” Instead of
Objective Quantum States?
What we are suggesting is that perhaps Eq. (64) should
be taken as one of the basic axioms of quantum theory,
since it provides a particularly clear way of thinking of
the Born Rule as an addition to Dutch-book coherence.
This addition is empirically based and gives extra nor-
mative rules, beyond the standard rules of probability
theory, to guide the agent’s behavior when he interacts
with the physical world.
But, one may well ask, what is our problem with the
standard way of expressing the Born Rule in the first
place? How is introducing an addition to Dutch-book
coherence conceptually any more palatable than intro-
ducing objective quantum states or objective probability
distributions? For, if the program is successful, then the
demand that q(j) be a proper probability distribution
will place necessary restrictions on p(i) and r(j|i). This—
a skeptic would say—is the very sign that one is dealing
with objective (or agent-independent) probabilities in the
first place. Why would a personalist Bayesian accept any
a priori restrictions on his probability assignments? And
particularly, restrictions supposedly of empirical origin?
The reply is this. It is true that through an axiom
like Eq. (64) one gets a restriction on the ranges of the
various probabilities one can contemplate holding. But
that restriction in no way diminishes the functional role
of prior beliefs in the makings of an agent’s particular
assignments p(i) and r(j|i). That is, this addition to
Dutch-book coherence preserves the points expressed in
the quote by Keynes in Section II in a way that objective
chance cannot.
Take the usual notion of objective chance, as given
operational meaning through David Lewis’ “Principal
Principle” (Lewis, 1986a,b). If an event A has objec-
tive chance ch(A) = x, then the subjective, personalist
probability an agent (any agent) should ascribe to A on
the condition of knowing the chance proposition is
Prob
(
A
∣∣∣ “ch(A) = x” ∧ E) = x (66)
where E is any “admissible” proposition. There is some
debate about what precisely constitutes an admissible
proposition, but an example of a proposition universally
accepted to be compatible in spite of these interpretive
details is this:
E = “All my experience causes me to believe A
with probability 75%.”
That is, upon knowing an objective chance, all prior
beliefs should be overridden. Regardless of the agent’s
firmly held belief about A, that belief becomes irrelevant
once he is apprised of the objective chance.
When it comes to quantum mechanics, philosophers
of science who find something digestible in Lewis’ idea,
often view the Born Rule itself as a healthy serving of
Principal Principle. Only, it has the quantum state ρ
15
filling the role of chance. That is, for any agent contem-
plating performing a measurement {Pj}, his subjective,
personal probabilities for the outcomes j should condi-
tion on knowledge of the quantum state just as one con-
ditions with the Principal Principle:
Prob
(
j
∣∣ ρ ∧ E) = tr ρPj , (67)
where E is any “admissable” proposition. Beliefs are
beliefs, but quantum states are something else: They are
the facts of nature that power a quantum version of the
Principal Principle. In other words, in this context one
has conceptually
ρ −→ “ch(j) = tr ρPj” . (68)
But the Quantum-Bayesian view cannot sanction this.
For, the essential point for a Quantum Bayesian is that
there is no such thing as the quantum state. There are
potentially as many states for a given quantum system as
there are agents. And that point is not diminished by ac-
cepting the addition to Dutch-book coherence described
in this paper. Indeed, it is just as with standard (non-
quantum) probabilities, where their subjectivity is not di-
minished by normatively satisfying standard Dutch-book
coherence.
The most telling reason for this arises directly from
quantum statistical practice. The way one comes to a
quantum-state assignment is ineliminably dependent on
one’s priors (Caves, 2007; Fuchs, 2002, 2009). Quantum
states are not god-given, but have to be fought for via
measurement, updating, calibration, computation, and
any number of related activities. The only place quantum
states are “given” outright—that is to say, the model on
which much of the notion of an objective quantum state
arises from in the first place—is in a textbook homework
problem. For instance, a textbook exercise might read,
“Assume a hydrogen atom in its ground state. Calcu-
late . . . .” But outside the textbook it is not difficult
to come up with examples where two agents looking at
the same data, differing only in their prior beliefs, will
asymptotically update to distinct (even orthogonal) pure
quantum-state assignments for the same system (Fuchs,
2009).19 Thus the basis for one’s particular quantum-
state assignment is always outside the formal apparatus
of quantum mechanics.20
19 Here is a simple if contrived example. Consider a two-qubit sys-
tem for which two agents have distinct quantum-state assign-
ments ρ+ and ρ−, defined by ρ± =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|⊗2+|±〉〈±|⊗2) where
|±〉 = 2−1/2(|0〉 ± |1〉). These state assignments are “compati-
ble” in several of the senses of (Brun, 2002; Caves, 2002d), yet
suppose the first qubit is measured in the basis {|0〉, |1〉} and
outcome 1 is found. The two agents’ post-measurement states
for the second qubit are |+〉 and |−〉, respectively. See (Fuchs,
2009) for a more thorough discussion.
20 Nor, does it help to repeat over and over, as one commonly
hears coming from the philosophy-of-physics community, “quan-
This is the key difference between the set of ideas be-
ing developed here and the position of the objectivists:
added relations for probabilities, yes, but no one of those
probabilities can be objective in the sense of being any
less a pure function of the agent. A way to put it more
prosaically is that these normative considerations may
narrow the agent from the full probability simplex to the
set of quantum states, but beyond that, the formal appa-
ratus of quantum theory gives him no guidance on which
quantum state he should choose. Instead, the role of a
normative reading of the Born Rule is as it is with usual
Dutch book. Here is the way L. J. Savage put it rather
eloquently (Savage, 1954, p. 57).
According to the personalistic view, the role
of the mathematical theory of probability is
to enable the person using it to detect incon-
sistencies in his own real or envisaged behav-
ior. It is also understood that, having de-
tected an inconsistency, he will remove it. An
inconsistency is typically removable in many
different ways, among which the theory gives
no guidance for choosing.
If an agent does not satisfy Eq. (64) with his personal
probability assignments, then he is not recognizing prop-
erly the change of conditions (or perhaps we could say
‘context’21) that a potential SIC measurement would
bring about. The theory gives no guidance for which of
his probabilities should be adjusted or how, but it does
say that they must be adjusted or “undesirable conse-
quences” will become unavoidable.
Expanding on this point, Bernardo and Smith put it
this way in (Bernardo, 1994, p. 4):
Bayesian Statistics offers a rationalist theory
of personalistic beliefs in contexts of uncer-
tainty, with the central aim of characterising
how an individual should act in order to avoid
certain kinds of undesirable behavioural in-
consistencies. . . . The goal, in effect, is to
establish rules and procedures for individu-
als concerned with disciplined uncertainty ac-
counting. The theory is not descriptive, in
the sense of claiming to model actual be-
haviour. Rather, it is prescriptive, in the
sense of saying ‘if you wish to avoid the pos-
sibility of these undesirable consequences you
must act in the following way.’
tum probabilities are specified by physical law.” The simple
reply is, “No, they are not.” The phrase has no meaning once
one has taken on board that quantum states are born in proba-
bilistic considerations, rather than being the parents of them, as
laboratory practice clearly shows (Kaznady, 2009; Paris, 2004).
21 We add this alternative formulation so as to place the discussion
within the context of various other analyses of the idea of ‘con-
textuality’ (Appleby, 2005c; Ferrie, 2008, 2009; Grangier, 2002,
2005; Mermin, 1993; Spekkens, 2005, 2008).
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So much, indeed, we imagine for the full formal struc-
ture of quantum mechanics (including dynamics, tensor-
product structure, etc.)—that it is all or nearly all an
addition to Dutch-book coherence. And specifying those
“undesirable consequences” in terms independent of the
present considerations is a significant part of the project
of specifying the ontology underlying the Quantum-
Bayesian position. But that is a goal we have to leave
for future work. Let us now explore the consequences of
adopting Eq. (64) as a basic statement, acting as if we
do not yet know the underlying Hilbert-space structure
that gave rise to it.
V. DERIVING QUANTUM-STATE SPACE FROM
“EMPIRICALLY EXTENDED COHERENCE”
Let us see how far we can go toward deriving various
general features of quantum-state space from the concep-
tual apparatus portrayed in Figure 2. Remember that
we are representing quantum states by probability vec-
tors ‖p〉〉 lying in the probability simplex ∆d2 . The set
of pure states is given by the solutions of either Eq. (40)
or Eqs. (37) and (38), and can thus be thought of as an
algebraic variety within ∆d2 (Sullivant, 2006). The set of
all quantum states, pure or mixed, is the convex hull of
the set of pure states, i.e., the set of all convex combina-
tions of vectors ‖p〉〉 representing pure states. We want to
explore how much of this structure can be recovered from
the considerations summarized in Figure 2. We will have
to add at least three other assumptions on the nature of
quantum measurement, but at first, let us try to forget
as much about quantum mechanics as we can.
Namely, start with Figure 2 but forget about quantum
mechanics and forget about SICs. Simply visualize an
imaginary experiment in the sky S, supplemented with
various real experiments we might perform on the ground
G. We postulate that the probabilities we should ascribe
for the outcomes of G, are determined by the probabili-
ties we would ascribe to the imaginary outcomes in the
sky and the conditional probabilities for the outcomes
of G consequent upon them, were the measurement in
the sky factualized. Particularly we take Eq. (64) as a
postulate:
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)− 1
d
d2∑
i=1
r(j|i) . (69)
We call this postulate the urgleichung (German for
“primal equation”) to emphasize its primary status to
all our thinking. As before, p(i) represents the probabili-
ties in the sky and q(j) represents the probabilities on the
ground. The index i is assumed to range from 1 to d2, for
some fixed natural number d. The range of j will not be
fixed, but in any case considered will be denoted as run-
ning from 1 to m. (For example, for some cases m might
be d2, for some cases it might be d, but it need be nei-
ther and may be something else entirely—it will depend
upon which experiment we are talking about for G.) We
write r(j|i) to represent the conditional probability for
obtaining j on the ground, given that the experiment in
the sky was actually performed and resulted in outcome
i. When we want to suppress components, we will write
vectors ‖p〉〉 and ‖q〉〉, and write R for the matrix with
entries r(j|i). By definition, R is a stochastic matrix,
i.e.,
∑
j r(j|i) = 1, but not necessarily a doubly stochas-
tic matrix, i.e.,
∑
i r(j|i) = 1 does not necessarily hold
(Horn, 1985, pp. 526–528).
One of the main features we will require, of course, is
that calculated by Eq. (69), ‖q〉〉must satisfy 0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1
for all j. Thus, let us also honor the special inequality
0 ≤ (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)− 1
d
d2∑
i=1
r(j|i) ≤ 1 (70)
with a name: the fundamental inequality.
To proceed, let us define two sets P and R, the first
consisting of priors for the sky ‖p〉〉, and the second con-
sisting of stochastic matrices R.22 We shall sometimes
call P our state space, and its elements states. We will
say that P and R are consistent (with respect to the
fundamental inequality) if 1) for any fixed R ∈ R, there
is no ‖p〉〉 ∈ P that does not satisfy the fundamental in-
equality, and 2) for any fixed ‖p〉〉 ∈ P , there is no R ∈ R
that does not satisfy the fundamental inequality. With
respect to consistent sets P and R, for convenient termi-
nology, we call a general ‖p〉〉 ∈ ∆d2 valid if it is within
the state space P ; if it is not within P , we call it invalid.
What we want to pin down are the properties of P and
R under the assumption that they are maximal. By this
we mean that for any ‖p′〉〉 /∈ P , if we were to attempt
to create a new state space P ′ by adding ‖p′〉〉 to the
original P , P ′ and R would not be consistent. Similarly,
if we were to attempt to add a new point R′ to R. In
other words, when P and R are maximal, they are full
up with respect to any further additions. In summary,
1. P and R are said to be consistent if all pairs(‖p〉〉, R) ∈ P×R obey the fundamental inequality.
2. P and R are said to be maximal whenever P ′ ⊇ P
and R′ ⊇ R imply P ′ = P and R′ = R for any
consistent P ′ and R′.
The key idea behind the demand for maximality is that
we want the urgleichung to be as least exclusionary as
possible in limiting an agent’s probability assignments.
There is, of course, no guarantee without further assump-
tions there will be a unique maximal P and R consistent
with the fundamental inequality, or even whether there
22 The matrices R could also be regarded as part of the agent’s
prior, but since in this paper we keep R fixed once the mea-
surement on the ground is fixed, we reserve the term “prior” for
members of the set P.
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will be a unique set of them up to rotations or other kinds
of transformations, but we can certainly say some things.
One important result follows immediately: If P and R
are consistent and maximal, both sets must be convex.
For instance, if ‖p〉〉 and ‖p′〉〉 satisfy (70) for all R ∈ R it
is clear that, for any x ∈ [0, 1], ‖p′′〉〉 = x‖p〉〉+(1−x)‖p′〉〉
will as well. Thus, if ‖p′′〉〉 were not in P , the set would
not have been maximal to begin with.23 Furthermore,
maximality and the boundedness of Eq. (70) ensures that
P and R are closed sets, thus convex sets with extreme
points (Appleby, 2011).
Now, is there any obvious connection between P and
R? Let us make the innocuous assumption that one can
be completely ignorant of the outcomes in the sky:
Assumption 1:
‖p〉〉 =
(
1
d2
,
1
d2
, . . . ,
1
d2
)T
∈ P . (71)
Certainly for any real-world experiment, one can al-
ways be maximally ignorant of which of its outcomes will
occur! Suppose now that the experiment in the sky really
is performed as well as the experiment on the ground. Be-
fore either experiment, the agent is ignorant of both the
outcome i in the sky and the outcome j on the ground.
Using Bayes’ rule, he can find the conditional probability
for i given j, which has the form of a posterior probabil-
ity,
Prob(i|j) = r(j|i)∑
k r(j|k)
. (72)
Let us now make a less innocuous assumption:
Assumption 2: Principle of Reciprocity: Posteriors
from Maximal Ignorance Are Priors. For any R ∈ R,
a posterior probability Prob(i|j) as in Eq. (72) is a valid
prior p(i) for the outcomes of the measurement in the sky.
Moreover, for each valid p(i), there exists some R ∈ R
and some j such that p(i) = Prob(i|j) as in Eq. (72).
Quantum mechanics certainly has this property. For,
suppose a completely mixed state for our quantum sys-
tem and a POVM G = {Gj} measured on the ground.
23 It is important to recognize that the considerations leading to the
convexity of the state space here are distinct from the arguments
one finds in the “convex sets” and “operational” approaches to
quantum theory. See for instance (Busch, 1995; Holevo, 1982)
and more recently the BBLW school starting in (Barnum, 2006)
(and several publications thereafter), as well as the work of Hardy
(Hardy, 2001). There the emphasis is on the idea that a state
of ignorance about a finer preparation is a preparation itself.
The present argument even differs from some of our own ear-
lier Bayesian considerations (where care was taken not to view
‘preparation’ as an objective matter of fact, independent of prior
beliefs, as talk of preparation would seem to imply) (Fuchs, 2002;
Schack, 2003). Here instead, the emphasis is on the closure of
the fundamental inequality, i.e., maximal P and R.
Upon noting an outcome j on the ground, the agent will
use Eqs. (63) and (72) to infer
Prob(i|j) = trΠiGj
d trGj
. (73)
Defining
ρj =
Gj
trGj
, (74)
this says that
Prob(i|j) = 1
d
tr ρjΠi . (75)
In other words, Prob(i|j) is itself a SIC-representation
of a quantum state. Moreover, ρj can be any quantum
state whatsoever, simply by adjusting which POVM G is
under consideration.
A. Basis Distributions
Since we are free to contemplate any measurement on
the ground, let us consider the case where the ground
measurement is set to be the same as that of the sky. We
will denote r(j|i) by rS(j|i) in this special case. Remem-
bering that the probabilities on the ground, q(j), refer to
the case that the measurement in the sky remains coun-
terfactual, we must then have that p(j) = q(j) for any
valid ‖p〉〉, or, using the urgleichung,
p(j) = (d+ 1)
∑
i
p(i)rS(j|i)− 1
d
∑
i
rS(j|i) . (76)
Take the case where p(i) = 1d2 specifically. Substituting
for p(i) in Eq. (76), we find that the rS(j|i) must satisfy∑
i
rS(j|i) = 1 . (77)
Therefore, when going back to more general priors ‖p〉〉,
one has in fact the simpler relation
p(j) = (d+ 1)
∑
i
p(i)rS(j|i)− 1
d
. (78)
Introducing an appropriately sized matrixM of the form
M =


(d+ 1)− 1d − 1d · · · − 1d− 1d (d+ 1)− 1d · · · − 1d
...
. . .
...
− 1d − 1d · · · (d+ 1)− 1d


(79)
we can rewrite Eq. (78) in vector form,
MRS‖p〉〉 = ‖p〉〉 . (80)
At this point, we pause for a minor assumption on our
state space:
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Assumption 3 The elements ‖p〉〉 ∈ P span the full sim-
plex ∆d2 .
This is a very natural assumption: For if P did not span
the simplex, one would be justified in simply using a
smaller simplex for all considerations.
With Assumption 3, the only way Eq. (80) can be sat-
isfied is if
MRS = I . (81)
Since M is a circulant matrix, its inverse is a circulant
matrix as well, and one can easily work out that,
rS(j|i) = 1
d+ 1
(
δij +
1
d
)
. (82)
It follows by the Principle of Reciprocity (our Assump-
tion 2) then that among the distributions in P , along
with the uniform distribution, there are at least d2 other
ones, namely:
‖ek〉〉 =
(
1
d(d+ 1)
, . . . ,
1
d
, . . . ,
1
d(d+ 1)
)T
, (83)
with a 1d in the k
th slot and 1d(d+1) in all other slots.
We shall call these d2 special distributions, appropriately
enough, the basis distributions.
Notice that, in the special case of quantum mechanics,
the basis distributions are just the SIC states themselves,
now justified in a more general setting. Also, like the SIC
states, we will have∑
i
ek(i)
2 =
2
d(d + 1)
∀k , (84)
in accordance with Eq. (37).
B. A Bloch Sphere
Consider a class of measurements for the ground that
have a property we shall call in-step unpredictability, ISU.
The property is this: Whenever one assigns a uniform
distribution for the measurement in the sky, one also as-
signs a uniform distribution for the measurement on the
ground. This is meant to express the idea that the mea-
surement on the ground has no in-built bias with respect
to one’s expectations of the sky: Complete ignorance of
the outcomes of one translates into complete ignorance
of the outcomes of the other. (In the full-blown quan-
tum mechanical setting, this corresponds to a POVM
{Gj} such that trGj is a constant value—von Neumann
measurements with d outcomes being one special case of
this.)
Denote the r(j|i) and corresponding matrix R in this
special case by rISU(j|i) and RISU, respectively, and sup-
pose the measurement being spoken of has m outcomes.
Our demand is that
1
m
=
(d+ 1)
d2
∑
i
rISU(j|i)− 1
d
∑
i
rISU(j|i) . (85)
To meet this, we must have
∑
i
rISU(j|i) = d
2
m
, (86)
and the urgleichung becomes
q(j) = (d+ 1)
∑
i
p(i)rISU(j|i)− d
m
. (87)
Suppose now that a prior ‖s〉〉 for the sky happens to
arise in accordance with Eq. (72) for one of these ISU
measurements. That is,
s(i) =
rISU(j|i)∑
k rISU(j|k)
, (88)
for some RISU and some j. Then Eq. (87) tells us that
for any ‖p〉〉 ∈ P , we must have
0 ≤ d
2
m
(d+ 1)
∑
i
p(i)s(i)− d
m
≤ 1 . (89)
In other words, for any ‖s〉〉 of our specified variety and
any ‖p〉〉 ∈ P , the following constraint must be satisfied
1
d(d+ 1)
≤
∑
i
p(i)s(i) ≤ d+m
d2(d+ 1)
. (90)
Think particularly on the case where ‖s〉〉 = ‖p〉〉. Then
we must have
∑
i
p(i)2 ≤ d+m
d2(d+ 1)
. (91)
Note how this compares to Eq. (84).
Now, suppose there are ISU measurements (distinct
from simply bringing the sky measurement down to the
ground) that have the basis distributions ‖ek〉〉 as their
posteriors in the way of Assumption 2, the Principle of
Reciprocity. If this is so, then note that according to
Eq. (84) the bound in Eq. (91) will be violated unless
m ≥ d. Moreover, it will not be tight for the basis states
unless m = d precisely.
Thinking of a basis distribution as the prototype of
an extreme-point state (for after all, they give the most
predictability possible for the measurement in the sky),
this motivates the next assumption—this one being sig-
nificantly stronger than the previous two:
Assumption 4 Every extreme point ‖p〉〉 ∈ P arises in
the manner of Eq. (88) as the posterior of an ISU mea-
surement with m = d and achieves equality in Eq. (91).
Thus, for any two extreme points ‖p〉〉 and ‖s〉〉, we are
assuming
1
d(d+ 1)
≤
∑
i
p(i)s(i) ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
, (92)
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with equality in the right-hand side when ‖s〉〉 = ‖p〉〉.24
Thus, the extreme points of P live on a sphere
∑
i
p(i)2 =
2
d(d+ 1)
, (93)
Further trivial aspects of quantum-state space follow im-
mediately from the requirement of Eq. (92) for any two
extreme points. For instance, since the basis distribu-
tions are among the set of valid states, for any other
valid state ‖p〉〉 no component in it can be too large. This
follows because
〈〈p‖ek〉〉 = 1
d(d+ 1)
+
1
d+ 1
p(k) . (94)
The right-hand side of Eq. (92) then requires
p(k) ≤ 1
d
. (95)
But, do we have enough to get to us all the way to
Eq. (41) in addition to Eq. (37)? We will analyze as-
pects of this in the next subsection. First however, let us
linger a bit over the significance of the sphere.
What we have postulated in a natural way is that the
extreme points of P must live on a (d2 − 1)-sphere cen-
tered at the zero vector. But then it comes for free that
these extreme points must also live on a smaller-radius
(d2 − 2)-sphere centered at
‖c〉〉 =
(
1
d2
,
1
d2
, . . . ,
1
d2
)T
. (96)
This is because the ‖p〉〉 live on the probability simplex
∆d2 . For, let ‖w〉〉 = ‖p〉〉 − ‖c〉〉, where ‖p〉〉 is any point
satisfying Eq. (93). Then
r2 = 〈〈w‖w〉〉 = d− 1
d2(d+ 1)
(97)
gives the radius of the lower-dimensional sphere.
The sphere in Eq. (97) is actually the more natural
sphere for us to think about, as most of the sphere in
Eq. (93)—all but a set of measure zero—is thrown away
anyway. In fact, it may legitimately be considered the
higher-dimensional analog of the Bloch sphere from the
Quantum-Bayesian point of view. Indeed, when d = 2,
24 By the way, it should be noted that this inequality establishes
that if P at least contains the actual quantum-state space, it
can contain no more than that. That is, the full set of quantum
states is, in fact, a maximal set. For suppose a SIC exists, yet
‖s〉〉 corresponds to some non-positive-semidefinite operator via
the mapping in Eq. (30). Then there will be some ‖p〉〉 ∈ P cor-
responding to a pure quantum state such that the left-hand side
of Eq. (92) is violated. This follows immediately from the defini-
tion of positive semi-definiteness and the expression for Hilbert-
Schmidt inner products in Eq. (49).
we have a 2-sphere, and it is isomorphic to the usual
Bloch sphere.
It is natural to think of the statement∑
i
p(i)2 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
for all ‖p〉〉 ∈ P (98)
in information theoretic terms. This is because two
well-known measures of the uncertainty associated with
a probability assignment—the Renyi and Daro´czy en-
tropies (Acze´l, 1975) of order 2—are simple functions of
the left-hand side of it. Recall the Renyi entropies most
generally (defined for all α ≥ 1)
Rα(‖p〉〉) = 1
1− α ln
(∑
i
p(i)α
)
(99)
as well as the Daro´czy entropies
Dα(‖p〉〉) = 1
21−α − 1
(∑
i
p(i)α − 1
)
. (100)
In the limit α → 1, these both converge to the Shannon
entropy. The characterization of quantum-state space
appears to provide an application of these entropies for
the value α = 2.
To put it in a slogan (Caves, 1996; Fuchs, 2010), “In
quantum mechanics, maximal information is not com-
plete and cannot be completed.” The sharpest pre-
dictability one can have for the outcomes of a SIC mea-
surement is specified by Eq. (37). This is an old idea,
of course, but quantified here in yet another way. It
is related to the basic idea underlying the toy model of
R. W. Spekkens (Spekkens, 2007), with its “knowledge
balance principle.” In that model, which combines lo-
cal hidden variables with an “epistemic constraint” on
an agent’s knowledge of the variables’ values, more than
twenty well-known quantum information theoretic phe-
nomena (like no-cloning (Dieks, 1982; Wootters, 1982),
no-broadcasting (Barnum, 1996), teleportation (Bennett,
1993), correlation monogamy (Coffman, 2000), “nonlo-
cality without entanglement” (Bennett, 1999), etc.) are
readily reproduced, at least in a qualitative way.
Despite the toy model’s impressive successes, however,
we suspect that an information constraint alone cannot
support the more sweeping part of the Quantum Bayesian
program, that “the possible outcomes cannot correspond
to actualities, existing objectively prior to asking the
question,” i.e., that unperformed measurements have no
outcomes. In ways, there is a world of difference be-
tween the present considerations to do with an addition
to Dutch-book coherence and “epistemic restriction” ap-
proaches. First, it is hard to see how that line of thought
can get beyond the possibility of an underlying hidden-
variable model (as the toy model illustrates). Second,
and more importantly, in the present approach the Bloch
sphere may well express an epistemic constraint—a con-
straint on an agent’s advised certainty. But the epistemic
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constraint is itself a result of a deeper consideration to
do with the coherence between factual and counterfac-
tual gambles, not a starting point. Furthermore, the
constraint is not expressible in terms of a single infor-
mation function anyway; instead it involves pairs of dis-
tributions. We go on to explain this point.
C. But Only Part of It
The state-space implied by Eq. (92) does not lead to
the full sphere in Eq. (97). According to the left-hand
side of Eq. (92), when two points are too far away from
each other, at least one of them cannot be in P . We will
show this more carefully in the next section: that the
extreme ‖p〉〉 ∈ P comprise only part of a sphere. Of some
interest, however, is that Eq. (97) already tells us that
we cannot have the full sphere as well. For, the radius
of the sphere is such that the sphere extends beyond the
boundary of the probability simplex ∆d2 . Hence, P is
contained within a nontrivial intersection of sphere and
simplex.
This is established by a nice argument due to Gabriel
Plunk (Plunk, 2002). Let us calculate the shortest dis-
tance between ‖c〉〉 and an n-flat of the simplex—an n-
flat is defined so that it contains only probability vectors
with n vanishing components. For instance, all ‖p〉〉 of
the form
‖pn〉〉 =
(
p(1), p(2), . . . , p(d2 − n), 0, 0, . . . , 0
)T
, (101)
with d2 − n initial nonvanishing components and n fi-
nal vanishing components, form an n-flat. A more gen-
eral n-flat would have all the vanishing and nonvanishing
components interspersed.
What is the minimal distance Dmin
(
‖c〉〉, ‖pn〉〉
)
be-
tween the center point and an n-flat? Taking
D2
(
‖c〉〉, ‖pn〉〉
)
=
d2−n∑
i=1
(
pn(i)− 1
d2
)2
+
d2∑
i=d2−n+1
(
0− 1
d2
)2
(102)
generally, and recognizing the constraint
d2−n∑
i=1
pn(i) = 1 , (103)
we can use the calculus of variations to find
D2min
(
‖c〉〉, ‖pn〉〉
)
=
n
d2(d2 − n) , (104)
Can there be an n for which
D2min
(
‖c〉〉, ‖pn〉〉
)
< r2 ? (105)
where r is defined by Eq. (97)? In other words, can the
sphere ever poke outside of the probability simplex? Just
solving the inequality for n gives n < 12d(d− 1).
Thus, when n < 12d(d− 1), the point
‖ps(n)〉〉 ≡
(
1
d2 − n,
1
d2 − n, . . . ,
1
d2 − n, 0, 0, . . . , 0
)
(106)
on an n-flat surface of the simplex lies within the sphere
the extreme points of P inhabit. Only in the case of the
qubit, d = 2, does the sphere reside completely within the
simplex—the set is equivalent to the well-known Bloch
sphere.
A corollary to Plunk’s derivation is that we can put a
(weak) bound on the maximum number of zero compo-
nents a valid ‖p〉〉 can contain. To have n zero compo-
nents, ‖p〉〉 must live on an n-flat. But extreme ‖p〉〉 are
always a distance D2extreme =
d−1
d2(d+1) from ‖c〉〉. So, if n
is such that
D2min
(
‖c〉〉, ‖pn〉〉
)
> D2extreme , (107)
then ‖p〉〉 cannot live on the n-flat. This limits n: If
n > 12d(d − 1), then a state cannot live on that n-flat.
Thus, for a valid ‖p〉〉, there is an upper bound to how
many zero components it can have25:
nzeros ≤ 1
2
d(d− 1) . (108)
However, an alternative and more direct argument for
Eq. (108) is this—it is a straightforward application of
the Schwarz inequality:
1 =

 ∑
nonzero
terms
p(i)


2
≤
(
d2 − nzeros
) ∑
nonzero
terms
p(i)2


25 Our first inclination was that this is surely a weak bound. But
even in quantum mechanics, we know of no better bound than
this. This follows from the best bound we are aware of in that
context, a Hilbert-space bound of Delsarte, Goethels, and Sei-
del (Delsarte, 1975) (which we note can also be proven by ele-
mentary Gram matrix methods in Hilbert-Schmidt space). Let
Pi, i = 1, ..., v, be a set of rank-1 projection operators on an
f -dimensional Hilbert space Hf such that trPiPj = c, for all
i 6= j. Then
v ≤ f(1− c)
1− fc .
To find the maximum number of zero components ‖p〉〉 can con-
tain, we just need to ask the question of how many SIC vectors
can possibly fit in a (d− 1)-dimensional subspace. Inserting the
parameters f = d− 1 and c = 1/(d+1) into this bound, we find
nzeros ≤ 12d(d − 1). Interestingly, this bound is saturated when
d = 2 and d = 3. On the other hand, in dimensions d = 4 and
d = 5, D. M. Appleby has checked exhaustively for the known
SICs that never more than d−1 of the vectors fit within a (d−1)-
dimensional subspace (Appleby, 2012, private communication).
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=
(
d2 − nzeros
) 2
d(d+ 1)
. (109)
Eq. (108) follows immediately.
But this is only the beginning of the trimming of the
Bloch sphere: More drastic restrictions come from the
left-hand of the fundamental inequality.
D. An Underlying ‘Dimensionality’?
What else does the inequality in Eq. (92) imply? Here
is at least one more low hanging fruit. The left side of
Eq. (92) signifies that the “most orthogonal” two valid
distributions ‖p〉〉 and ‖q〉〉 can ever be is
〈〈p‖q〉〉 =
∑
i
p(i)q(i) =
1
d(d+ 1)
. (110)
Their overlap can never approach zero; they can never
be truly orthogonal. Now, suppose we have a collection
of distributions ‖pk〉〉, k = 1, . . . , n, all of which live on
the sphere—that is, they individually saturate the right-
hand side of Eq. (92). We can ask, how large can the
number n can be while maintaining that each of the ‖pk〉〉
be maximally orthogonal to each other. Another way to
put it is, what is the maximum number of “mutually
maximally distant” states?
In other words, we would like to satisfy
〈〈pk‖pl〉〉 = δkl + 1
d(d+ 1)
(111)
for as many values as possible. It turns out that there
is a nontrivial constraint on how large n can be, and it
is nothing other than n = d—the same thing one sees in
quantum mechanics.
To see this, let us again reference the center of the
probability simplex with all our vectors. Define
‖wk〉〉 = ‖pk〉〉 − ‖c〉〉 . (112)
In these terms, our constraint becomes
〈〈wk‖wl〉〉 = dδkl − 1
d2(d+ 1)
. (113)
However, notice what this means: We are asking for a
set of vectors whose Gram matrix G = [〈〈wk‖wl〉〉] is an
n× n matrix of the form
G =


a b b · · · b
b a b · · · b
...
. . .
...
b b b · · · a

 (114)
with
a =
d− 1
d2(d+ 1)
and b =
−1
d2(d+ 1)
. (115)
By an elementary theorem in linear algebra, a proposed
set of vectors with a proposed Gram matrix G can ex-
ist if and only if G is positive semi-definite (Horn, 1985,
pp. 407–408). Moreover, the rank of G represents the
number of linearly independent such vectors. (We write
“proposed” because if G is not positive semi-definite,
then of course there are no such vectors.)
Since G in Eq. (114) is a circulant matrix, its eigenval-
ues can be readily calculated: one takes the value
λ0 = a+ (n− 1)b = d− n
d2(d+ 1)
(116)
while all the n− 1 others are
λk = a− b = 1
d(d+ 1)
. (117)
To make G positive semi-definite, then, we must have
n ≤ d, with n = d being the maximal value. At that
point G is a rank-(d − 1) matrix, so that only d − 1 of
the ‖wl〉〉 are linearly independent.
On the other hand, all d vectors ‖pk〉〉 = ‖wk〉〉 + ‖c〉〉
actually are linearly independent. To see this, suppose
there are numbers αi such that
∑
i αi‖pi〉〉 = 0 . Acting
from the left on this equation with 〈〈c‖, one obtains∑
i
αi = 0 . (118)
On the other hand, acting on it with 〈〈pk‖, we obtain
0 =
2
d(d+ 1)
αk +
1
d(d+ 1)
∑
i6=k
αi
=
1
d(d+ 1)
αk +
1
d(d+ 1)
∑
i
αi
=
1
d(d+ 1)
αk . (119)
So indeed,∑
i
αi‖pi〉〉 = 0 =⇒ αk = 0 ∀k . (120)
What this reveals is a significantly smaller “dimension”
for the valid states on the surface of the sphere than one
might have thought. A priori, one might have thought
that one could get nearly d2 maximally equidistant points
on the sphere, but it is not so—only d instead. This is cer-
tainly a suggestive result, but “dimension” at this stage
must remain in quotes. Ultimately one must see that
the Hausdorff dimension of the manifold of valid extreme
states is 2d− 2 (i.e., what it is in quantum theory), and
the present result does not get that far.
E. Summary of the Argument So Far
Let us summarize the assumptions made to this point
and summarize their consequences as well.
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Assumption 0: The Urgleichung. See Figure 2. De-
grees of belief for outcomes in the sky and degrees of be-
lief for outcomes on the ground ought to be related by this
fundamental equation:
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i) − 1
d
d2∑
i=1
r(j|i) . (121)
From the urgleichung, the fundamental inequality arises
by the requirement that 0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1 always. The sets P
and R are defined to be sets of priors ‖p〉〉 and stochastic
matrices R, that are consistent and maximal.
Assumption 1: The state of maximal ignorance ‖c〉〉 in
Eq. (96) is included in P .
Assumption 2: Principle of Reciprocity: Posteriors
from Maximal Ignorance Are Priors. For any R ∈ R,
a posterior probability consequent upon outcome j of a
ground measurement,
Prob(i|j) = r(j|i)∑
k r(j|k)
(122)
may be taken as a valid prior p(i) for the outcomes of the
measurement in the sky. Moreover, all valid priors p(i)
may arise in this way.
Assumption 3: P spans the probability simplex ∆d2 .
Assumption 4: Extreme-Point Preparations. The ex-
treme points of the convex set P may all be generated
as the posteriors of a suitably chosen ground measure-
ment for which maximal ignorance of sky outcomes im-
plies maximal ignorance of ground outcomes. Moreover,
these measurements all have the minimum number of out-
comes consistent with generating the basis distributions
‖ek〉〉 in this way.
With these four assumptions, we derived that the basis
distributions ‖ek〉〉 should be among the valid states P .
We derived that for any ‖p〉〉 ∈ P , the probabilities are
bounded above by p(k) ≤ 1d . We derived that the ex-
treme points of the valid ‖p〉〉 should live on the surface
of a sphere that at times pokes outside the probability
simplex. We found a bound, given in Eq. (108), on the
number of zero components of ‖p〉〉 that is as good as
the best known bound that has been derived using the
conventional quantum formalism. Most particularly we
derived that for any two valid distributions ‖p〉〉 and ‖s〉〉
(including the case where ‖p〉〉 = ‖s〉〉), it must hold that
1
d(d+ 1)
≤
∑
i
p(i)s(i) ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (123)
From the latter, it follows that no more than d extreme
points ‖p〉〉 can ever be mutually maximally distant from
each other. Furthermore we showed that not every flat
zeros-bound vector can be a valid ‖p〉〉.
These are all hints that our structure might just be
isomorphic to quantum-state space under the assumption
that SICs exist. What really needs to be derived is that
the extreme points of such a convex set correspond to an
algebraic variety of the form
p(k) =
(d+ 1)2
3d
∑
ij
cijk p(i)p(j)− 1
3d
, (124)
as given in Eq. (40), with a set of cijk that can be writ-
ten in the form of Eq. (39). Whether this step can be
made without making any further assumptions, we do
not know. Nor do we have a strong feeling presently of
whether the auxiliary Assumptions 1–4 are the ones best
posited for achieving our goal. The key idea is to sup-
plement Assumption 0 with as little extra structure as
possible for getting all the way to full-blown quantum
mechanics. Much work remains, both at the technical
and conceptual level.
VI. RELAXING THE CONSTANTS AND REGAINING
THEM
But what is the origin of the urgleichung in the first
place? In this Section, which in part follows closely
(Fuchs, 2011), we take a small step toward a deeper un-
derstanding of the particular form our relation takes in
Eq. (121). We do this by initially generalizing away from
Eq. (121) and then testing what it takes to get back to
it.
What we mean by this is that we should imagine the
more general set-up in Figure 2, where the number of
outcomes for the measurement in the sky is potentially
some more general number n (not initially assumed to
be a perfect square d2). Furthermore we drop away all
traces of the parameter d, by considering a generalized
urgleichung with two initially arbitrary parameters α and
β. That is to say, for this Section, our fundamental pos-
tulate will be:
Resumption 0: Generalized Urgleichung. For
whichever experiment we are talking about for the ground,
q(j) should be calculated according to
q(j) = α
n∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i) − β
n∑
i=1
r(j|i) , (125)
where α and β are fixed nonnegative real numbers.
Otherwise, all considerations will be the same as they
were in the beginning of Section V. Particularly, the mea-
surements on the ground can have any number m of out-
comes, where the value m in any individual case will be
set by the details of the measurement under consideration
at that time. Our goal will be to see what assumptions
can be added to this basic scenario so that the urgle-
ichung in Eq. (121) re-arises in a natural manner. That
is to say, we would like to see what assumptions can be
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added to this recipe so that α = d+1, β = 1d , and n = d
2
(for some d) are the end result.
Immediately, one can see that n, α, and β cannot be
independent. This just follows from the requirements
that
m∑
j=1
q(j) = 1,
m∑
j=1
r(j|i) = 1 ∀i, and
n∑
i=1
p(i) = 1 .
(126)
Summing both left and right sides of Eq. (125) over j,
one obtains,
nβ = α− 1 . (127)
Furthermore, since β 6= 0 is assumed, requiring q(j) ≥ 0
necessitates
α
β
≥
∑
i r(j|i)∑
i p(i)r(j|i)
≥ 1 . (128)
As before, we now start studying the consequences of
the full requirement that 0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1, in the form of a
generalized fundamental inequality:
0 ≤ α
n∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i) − β
n∑
i=1
r(j|i) ≤ 1 . (129)
The two sets P and R are defined analogously to the
discussion just after Eq. (70), the first a set of priors
for the sky and the second a set of conditionals for the
ground (given the outcomes i in the sky). P and R are
taken to be consistent and maximal.
Two assumptions, we shall borrow straight away from
our previous development in Section V.
Resumption 1: Principle of Reciprocity: Posteriors
from Maximal Ignorance Are Priors. For any R ∈ R,
a posterior probability, consequent upon outcome j of a
ground measurement,
Prob(i|j) = r(j|i)∑
k r(j|k)
(130)
may be taken as a valid prior p(i) for the outcomes of the
measurement in the sky. Moreover, all valid priors p(i)
may arise in this way.
Resumption 2: Basis states span the simplex ∆d2 . The
conditional probabilities r(j|i) derived from setting the
ground measurement equal to the sky measurement give
rise to posterior distributions ‖ek〉〉, via Eq. (130), that
span the whole probability simplex.
At this stage, the argument goes just as it did in Sec-
tion V.A. In terms of the constants α and β, the compo-
nents ek(i) of the basis states satisfy the equations
ek(i) =
1
α
(δki + β) (131)
and ∑
i
ek(i)
2 =
1
α2
(
1 + 2β + nβ2
)
. (132)
Let us now consider a measurement with in-step unpre-
dictability for a measurement on the ground with m out-
comes (m 6= n)—that is, a measurement on the ground
such that if one has a flat distribution for the outcomes
in the sky, one will also have a flat distribution for the
outcomes on the ground. Let us again denote r(j|i) by
rISU(j|i) in this special case. Following the manipulations
we did before, we must have∑
i
rISU(j|i) = n
m
. (133)
By the Principle of Reciprocity, this ISU measurement
gives rise to a class of priors which we denote by ‖pk〉〉,
k = 1, . . . ,m. Their components are given by
pk(i) =
m
n
rISU(k|i) ; (134)
each vector ‖pk〉〉 represents a valid prior in the sky.
Let us now introduce a new notion that we did not
make use of in the previous development: We shall
say that a measurement with in-step unpredictability
achieves the ideal of certainty if ‖p〉〉 = ‖pk〉〉 implies that
q(j) = δjk, i.e., for such a measurement and a prior in the
sky given by ‖pk〉〉, the agent is certain that the outcome
on the ground will be k.
This leads to the following assumption:
Resumption 3: Availability of Certainty.26 For any
system, there is a measurement with in-step unpre-
dictability of some number m0 ≥ 2 of outcomes that (i)
achieves the ideal of certainty and (ii) for which one of
the priors ‖pk〉〉 defined in Eq. (134) has the form of a
basis distribution (131).
For a measurement of this type, we have
〈〈pj‖pk〉〉 = 1
α
(m0
n
δjk + β
)
, j, k = 1, . . . ,m0 ,
(135)
where 〈〈·‖·〉〉 denotes the inner product. Using condition
(ii) of the above resumption, it follows that the squared
26 In several axiomatic developments of quantum theory—see for
instance (Goyal, 2008) and (Hardy, 2001)—the idea of repeated
measurements giving rise to certainty (and the associated idea
of “distinguishable states”) is viewed as fundamental. However,
from the Quantum-Bayesian view where all measurements are
generative of their outcomes—i.e., outcomes never pre-exist the
act of measurement—and certainty is always subjective certainty
(Caves, 2007), the consistency of adopting a state of certainty as
one’s state of belief, even in what is judged to be a repeated
experiment, is not self-evident at all. In fact, from this point of
view, why one ever has certainty is the greater of the mysteries.
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norm 〈〈pk‖pk〉〉 of any of the vectors ‖pk〉〉 is equal to the
squared norm of the basis vectors given by Eq. (132).
This, together with Eq. (127) now implies that
m0
n
α− β = 1 (136)
for any measurement satisfying Resumption 3.
Equation (135) expresses that any two of the vectors
‖pk〉〉 differ by the same angle, θ, defined by
cos θ =
〈〈p1‖p2〉〉
〈〈p1‖p1〉〉 . (137)
Using the relations (127) and (136) between our four vari-
ables, α, β, n and m0 established above, this angle can
be seen to equal
cos θ =
n−m0
(m0 − 1)2 + n− 1 . (138)
We are now ready to state our last resumption.
Resumption 4: Many Systems, Universal Angle. The
identity of a system is parameterized by its pair (n,m0).
Nonetheless for all systems, the angle θ between pairs
of priors ‖pk〉〉 for any measurement satisfying Resump-
tion 3 is a universal constant given by cos θ = 1/2.
The value cos θ = 1/2 is less arbitrary than it may appear
at first sight. Taken by itself, the assumption that θ is
universal implies that, for any m0 ≥ 2, there is an integer
n such that the right-hand side of Eq. (138) evaluates to
the constant cos θ. It is not hard to show that this is
possible only if this constant is of the form
cos θ =
q
q + 2
, (139)
where q is a non-negative integer. The universal angle
postulated above corresponds to the choice q = 2.
Every choice for q leads to a different relation between
n and m0. For q = 0, we find n = m0, in which case the
urgleichung turns out to be identical to the classical law
of total probability. For q = 1, we get the relationship
n = 12m0(m0 +1) which, although this fact plays no role
in our argument, is characteristic of theories defined in
real Hilbert space (Wootters, 1986). And for q = 2, we
obtain
n = m20 . (140)
Equations (136) and (140) hold for the special mea-
surement postulated in Resumption 3. If we eliminatem0
from these equations we find, with the help of Eq. (127),
the relationships
n = (α− 1)2 , β = 1√
n
. (141)
These equalities must hold for any measurement on the
ground. If we denote the integer α − 1 by the letter d,
we recover the constants of the original urgleichung of
Eq. (121).
Let us reiterate slightly the philosophy here. The nu-
merical relations between the constants α, β, and n, and
in particular the fact that n is a perfect square, follow
from the existence of a single special measurement de-
fined in Resumption 3, together with the postulate of a
universal angle in Resumption 4. These last two resump-
tions, as well as the first three, are given purely in terms
of the personalist probabilities a Bayesian agent may as-
sign to the outcomes of certain experiments. Nowhere in
all this do we mention amplitudes, Hilbert space, or any
other part of the usual apparatus of quantum mechanics.
VII. SUMMARY: FROM QUANTUM INTERFERENCE
TO QUANTUM BAYESIAN COHERENCE
In this paper, we hope to have given a new and use-
ful way to think of quantum interference: Particularly,
we have shown how to view it as an empirical addition
to Dutch-book coherence, operative when one calculates
probabilities for the outcomes of a factualizable quantum
experiment in terms of one explicitly assumed counter-
factual. We did this and not once did we use the idea of a
probability amplitude. Thus we believe we have brought
the idea of quantum interference formally much closer to
its root in probabilistic considerations. For this, we were
aided by the mathematical machinery of SIC measure-
ments.
In so doing we showed that the Born Rule can be
viewed as a relation between probabilities, rather than
a setter of probabilities from something more firm or se-
cure than probability itself, i.e., rather than facilitating
a probability assignment from the quantum state. From
the Quantum-Bayesian point of view there is no such
thing as the quantum state, there being as many quan-
tum states for a system as there are agents interested
in considering it. This last point makes it particularly
clear why we needed a way of viewing the Born Rule as
an extension of Dutch-book coherence: One can easily in-
vent situations where two agents will update to divergent
quantum states (even pure states, and even orthogonal
pure states, see Footnote 19) by looking at the same em-
pirical data (Fuchs, 2002, 2004, 2009)—a quantum state
is always ultimately dependent on the agent’s priors.
But there is much more to do. We gave an indica-
tion that the urgleichung and considerations to do with
it already specifies a significant fraction of the structure
of quantum states—and for that reason one might want
to take it as one of the fundamental axioms of quantum
mechanics. We did not, however, get all the way back
to a set based on the manifold of pure quantum states,
Eq. (40). A further open question concerns the origin of
the urgleichung. An intriguing idea would be to justify
it Dutch-book style in terms of bought and returned lot-
tery tickets consequent upon the nullification step in our
standard scenario. Then the positive content of the Born
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Rule might be viewed as a kind of cost excised whenever
one factualizes a SIC. But this is just speculation.
What is firm is that we have a new setting for quan-
tifying the old idea that, in quantum mechanics, unper-
formed measurements have no outcomes.
VIII. OUTLOOK
Of every would be describer of the universe one has
a right to ask immediately two general questions.
The first is: “What are the materials of your uni-
verse’s composition?” And the second: “In what
manner or manners do you represent them to be
connected?”
— William James, notebook entry, 1903 or 1904
This paper has focussed on adding a new girder to the
developing structure of Quantum Bayesianism (‘QBism’
hereafter). As such, we have taken much of the previ-
ously developed program as a background for the present
efforts. The core arguments for why we choose a more
‘personalist Bayesianism’ rather than a so-called ‘objec-
tive Bayesianism’ can be found in (Fuchs, 2002, 2004,
2013). The argument for why a subjective, personalist
account of certainty is crucial for breaking the impasse set
by the EPR criterion of reality are explained in (Caves,
2007; Fuchs, 2013). Similarly for other questions on the
program.
Still, fearing James’ injunction, in this Section we want
to discuss anew the term ‘measurement,’ which we have
been using uncritically in the present paper. Providing a
deeper understanding of the proclamation ‘Unperformed
measurements have no outcomes!’ is, we feel, the first step
toward characterizing “the materials of our universe’s
composition.”
We take our cue from John Bell. Despite our liberal
use of the term so far, we think the word ‘measurement’
should indeed be banished from fundamental discussions
of quantum theory (Bell, 1990).27 However, it is not be-
cause the word is “unprofessionally vague and ambigu-
ous,” as Bell said of it (Bell, 1987).28 Rather, it is be-
cause, from the QBist perspective, the word suggests a
misleading notion of the very subject matter of quantum
mechanics.
To make the point dramatic, let us put quantum the-
ory to the side for a moment, and consider instead
basic Bayesian probability theory. There the subject
matter is an agent’s expectations for various outcomes.
For instance, an agent might write down a joint proba-
bility distribution P (hi, dj) for various mutually exclu-
27 For an argument in some sympathy with our own, see N. D.
Mermin’s “In Praise of Measurement” (Mermin, 2006).
28 To be sure, the are plenty of things vague and inconsistent in
the writings of Bohr, Pauli, Heisenberg, von Weizsa¨cker, Peierls,
and Peres (representatives of the so-called ‘orthodoxy’), but this
word we believe is not one of them.
sive hypotheses hi, i = 1, . . . , n, and data values dj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m, appropriate to some phenomenon. As dis-
cussed above, a major role of the theory is that it provides
a scheme (Dutch-book coherence) for how these probabil-
ities should be related to other probabilities, P (hi) and
P (dj) say, as well as to any other degrees of belief the
agent has for other phenomena. The theory also pre-
scribes that if the agent is given a specific data value
dj , he should update his expectations for everything else
within his interest. For instance, under the right condi-
tions (Diaconis, 1982; Fuchs, 2012; Skyrms, 1987b), he
should reassess his probabilities for the hi by condition-
alizing:
Pnew(hi) =
P (hi, dj)
P (dj)
. (142)
But what is this phrase “given a specific data value”?
What does it really mean in detail? Shouldn’t one spec-
ify a mechanism or at least a chain of logical and/or
physical connectives for how the raw fact signified by dj
comes into the field of the agent’s consciousness? And
who is this “agent” reassessing his probabilities anyway?
Indeed, what is the precise definition of an agent? How
would one know one when one sees one? Can a dog be
an agent? Or must it be a person? Maybe it should be
a person with a PhD?29
Probability theory has no chance of answering these
questions because they are not questions within the sub-
ject matter of the theory. Within probability theory, the
notions of “agent” and “given a data value” are primi-
tive and irreducible. Guiding agents’ decisions based on
data is what the whole theory is constructed for. As
such, agents and data are the highest elements within
the structure of probability theory—they are not to be
constructed from it, but rather the former are there to
receive the theory’s guidance, and the latter are there to
designate the world external to the agent.
QBism says that, if all of this is true of Bayesian prob-
ability theory in general, it is true of quantum theory as
well. As the foundations of probability theory dismisses
the questions of where data comes from and what con-
stitutes an agent—these questions never even come to its
attention—so can the foundations of quantum theory dis-
miss them too. This point is one of the strongest reasons
for making the QBist move in the first place.
A likely reaction at this point will be along these lines:
“It is one thing to say all this of probability theory, but
quantum theory is a wholly different story. Quantum me-
chanics is no simple branch of mathematics, be it proba-
bility or statistics. Nor can it plausibly be a theory about
the insignificant specks of life in our vast universe mak-
ing gambles and decisions. Quantum mechanics is one of
our best theories of the world! It is one of the best maps
we have drawn yet of what is actually out there.” But
29 Tongue-in-cheek reference to Bell again (Bell, 1990).
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FIG. 3 The Paulian Idea (Fuchs, 2010)—in the form of a fig-
ure inspired by John Archibald Wheeler (Wheeler, 1975). In
contemplating a quantum measurement, one makes a concep-
tual split in the world: one part is treated as an agent, and the
other as a kind of reagent or catalyst (one that brings about
change in the agent). In older terms, the former is an observer
and the latter a quantum system of some finite dimension d.
A quantum measurement consists first in the agent taking an
action on the quantum system. The action is formally cap-
tured by some POVM {Ei}. The action leads generally to an
incompletely predictable consequence, a particular personal
experience Ei for the agent (Fuchs, 2009). The quantum state
|ψ〉 makes no appearance but in the agent’s head; for it only
captures his degrees of belief concerning the consequences of
his actions, and—in contrast to the quantum system itself—
has no existence in the external world. Measurement devices
are depicted as prosthetic hands to make it clear that they
should be considered an integral part of the agent. (This
contrasts with Bohr’s view where the measurement device is
always treated as a classically describable system external to
the observer.) The sparks between the measurement-device
hand and the quantum system represent the idea that the con-
sequence of each quantum measurement is a unique creation
within the previously existing universe (Fuchs, 2009). Wolf-
gang Pauli characterized this picture as a “wider form of the
reality concept” than that of Einstein’s, which he labeled “the
ideal of the detached observer” (Gieser, 2005; Laurikainen,
1988; Pauli, 1994). What is important for modern devel-
opments is that the particular character of the catalysts—
i.e., James’ “materials of your universe’s composition”—must
leave its trace in the formal rules that allow us to conceptual-
ize factualizable measurements in terms of a standard coun-
terfactual one.
this is where QBism begs to differ. Quantum theory is
not a ‘theory of the world.’ Just like probability theory
is not a theory of the world, quantum theory is not as
well: It is a theory for the use of agents immersed in and
interacting with a world of a particular character, “the
quantum world.”
This last statement is crucial for understanding what
we are trying to say. Regarding the idea of a world ex-
ternal to the agent, it must be as Martin Gardner says
(Gardner, 1983),
The hypothesis that there is an external
world, not dependent on human minds, made
of something, is so obviously useful and
so strongly confirmed by experience down
through the ages that we can say without ex-
aggerating that it is better confirmed than
any other empirical hypothesis. So useful is
the posit that it is almost impossible for any-
one except a madman or a professional meta-
physician to comprehend a reason for doubt-
ing it.
Yet there is no implication in these words that quantum
theory, for all its success in chemistry, physical astron-
omy, laser making, and so much else, must be read as
a theory of the world. There is room for a significantly
more interesting form of dependence: Quantum theory
is conditioned by the character of the world, but yet is
not a theory directly of it. Confusion on this very point,
we believe, is what has caused most of the discomfort in
quantum foundations in the 85 years since the theory’s
coming to a relatively stable form in 1927.
Returning to our discussion of Bell and the word “mea-
surement,” we wish the word banished because it sublim-
inally whispers the philosophy of its birth: That quan-
tum mechanics should be conceived in a way that makes
no ultimate reference to agency, and that agents are con-
structed out of the theory, rather than taken as the prim-
itive entities the theory is meant to aid. In a nutshell, the
word deviously carries forward the impression that quan-
tum mechanics should be viewed as a theory directly of
the world.
Fixing the word “measurement” is the prerequisite to
a new ontology—in other words, prerequisite to a state-
ment about the (hypothesized) character of the world
that does not make direct reference to our actions and
gambles within it. Therefore, as a start, let us re-
build quantum mechanics in terms more conducive to
the Quantum Bayesian programme.
A. The Paulian Idea and the Jamesian Pluriverse
The best way to begin a more thoroughly QBist delin-
eation of quantum mechanics is to start with two quotes
on personalist Bayesianism itself. The first is from Hamp-
ton, Moore, and Thomas (Hampton, 1973),
Bruno de Finetti believes there is no need
to assume that the probability of some event
has a uniquely determinable value. His philo-
sophical view of probability is that it ex-
presses the feeling of an individual and cannot
have meaning except in relation to him.
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and the second from D. V. Lindley (Lindley, 1982),
The Bayesian, subjectivist, or coherent,
paradigm is egocentric. It is a tale of one per-
son contemplating the world and not wishing
to be stupid (technically, incoherent). He re-
alizes that to do this his statements of uncer-
tainty must be probabilistic.
These two quotes make it clear that personalist Bayesian-
ism is a “single-user theory.” Thus, QBism must inherit
at least this much egocentrism in its view of quantum
states ρ. The “Paulian Idea” (Fuchs, 2010)—which is
also essential to the QBist view—goes further still. It
says that the outcomes to quantum measurements are
single-user as well. That is to say, when an agent writes
down her degrees of belief for the outcomes of a quantum
measurement, what she is writing down are her degrees
of belief about her potential personal experiences arising
in consequence of her actions upon the external world
(Fuchs, 2009, 2010b, 2012; Mermin, 2012).
Before exploring this further, let us partially formalize
in a quick outline the structure of quantum mechanics
from this point of view, at the moment retaining the usual
mathematical formulation of the theory, but starting the
process of changing the English descriptions of what the
term “quantum measurement” means.
1. Primitive notions: a) the agent, b) things exter-
nal to the agent, or, more commonly, “systems,”
c) the agent’s actions on the systems, and d) the
consequences of those actions for her experience.
2. The formal structure of quantum mechanics is a
theory of how the agent ought to organize her
Bayesian probabilities for the consequences of all
her potential actions on the things around her. Im-
plicit in this is a theory of the structure of actions.
The theory works as follows:
3. When the agent posits a system, she posits a
Hilbert space Hd as the arena for all her consid-
erations.
4. Actions upon the system are captured by positive-
operator valued measures {Ei} on Hd. Potential
consequences of the action are labeled by the indi-
vidual elements Ei within the set.
30 I.e.,
action = {Ei} and consequence = Ek .
5. Quantum mechanics organizes the agent’s beliefs
by saying that she should strive to find a single
30 There is a formal similarity between this and the development
in Cox (Cox, 1961), where “questions” are treated as sets, and
“answers” are treated as elements within the sets.
density operator ρ such that her degrees of belief
will always satisfy
Prob
(
consequence
∣∣∣ action) = Prob(Ek ∣∣∣ {Ei})
= tr ρEk ,
no matter what action {Ei} is under consideration.
6. Unitary time evolution and more general quantum
operations (completely positive maps) do not repre-
sent objective underlying dynamics, but rather ad-
dress the agent’s belief changes accompanying the
flow of time, as well as belief changes consequent
upon any actions taken.
7. When the agent posits two things external to her-
self, the arena for all her considerations becomes
Hd1 ⊗Hd2 . Actions and consequences now become
POVMs on Hd1 ⊗Hd2 .
8. The agent can nonetheless isolate the notion of an
action on a single one of the things alone: These
are POVMs of the from {Ei⊗I}, and similarly with
the systems reversed {I ⊗ Ei}.
9. Resolving the consequence of an action on one of
the things may cause the agent to update her ex-
pectations for the consequences of any further ac-
tions she might take on the other thing. But for
those latter consequences to come about, she must
elicit them through an actual action on the second
system.
The present paper, of course, has predominantly fo-
cussed on Item 5 in this list, rewriting the point in purely
probabilistic terms. With regard to the discussion in the
present Section, however, the main points to note are
Items 4, 7, 8, and 9. Regarding our usage of the word
“measurement,” they say that one should think of it sim-
ply as an action upon the system of interest. Actions
lead to consequences within the experience of the agent,
and that is what a quantum measurement is. A quan-
tum measurement finds nothing, but very much makes
something.
Thus, in a QBist painting of quantum mechanics,
quantum measurements are “generative” in a very real
sense. But by that turn, the consequences of our actions
on physical systems must be egocentric as well. Mea-
surement outcomes come about for the agent himself.
Quantum mechanics is a single-user theory through and
through—first in the usual Bayesian sense with regard
to personal beliefs, and second in that quantum mea-
surement outcomes are wholly personal experiences.
Of course, as a single-user theory, quantum mechanics
is available to any agent to guide and better prepare him
for his own encounters with the world. And although
quantum mechanics has nothing to say about another
agent’s personal experiences, agents can communicate
and use the information gained from each other to update
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their probability assignments. In the spirit of the Pau-
lian Idea, however, querying another agent means taking
an action on him. Whenever “I” encounter a quantum
system, and take an action upon it, it catalyzes a con-
sequence in my experience that my experience could not
have foreseen. Similarly, by a Copernican-style princi-
ple, I should assume the same for “you”: Whenever you
encounter a quantum system, taking an action upon it,
it catalyzes a consequence in your experience. By one
category of thought, we are agents, but by another cate-
gory of thought we are physical systems. And when we
take actions upon each other, the category distinctions
are symmetrical. Like with the Rubin vase, the best the
eye can do is flit back and forth between the two formu-
lations.
The previous paragraph should have made clear that
viewing quantum mechanics as a single user theory does
not mean there is only one user. QBism does not lead
to solipsism. Any charge of solipsism is further re-
futed by two points central to the Paulian Idea. (Fuchs,
2002b). One is the conceptual split of the world into two
parts—one an agent and the other an external quantum
system—that gets the discussion of quantum measure-
ment off the ground in the first place. If such a split were
not needed for making sense of the question of actions
(actions upon what? in what? with respect to what?), it
would not have been made. Imagining a quantum mea-
surement without an autonomous quantum system par-
ticipating in the process would be as paradoxical as the
Zen koan of the sound of a single hand clapping. The
second point is that once the agent chooses an action
{Ei}, the particular consequence Ek of it is beyond his
control. That is to say, the particular outcome of a quan-
tum measurement is not a product of his desires, whims,
or fancies—this is the very reason he uses the calculus
of probabilities in the first place: they quantify his un-
certainty (Lindley, 2006), an uncertainty that, try as he
might, he cannot get around. So, implicit in this whole
picture—this whole Paulian Idea—is an “external world
. . . made of something,” just as Martin Gardner calls for.
It is only that quantum theory is a rather small theory:
Its boundaries are set by being a handbook for agents
immersed within that “world made of something.”
But a small theory can still have grand import, and
quantum mechanics most certainly does. This is because
it tells us how a user of the theory sees his role in the
world. Even if quantum mechanics—viewed as an addi-
tion to probability theory—is not a theory of the world
itself, it is certainly conditioned by the particular char-
acter of this world. Its empirical content is exemplified
by the simplest case of the urgleichung,
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)− 1 ,
which takes this specific form rather than an infinity of
other possibilities. Even though quantum theory is now
understood as a theory of acts, decisions, and conse-
quences (Savage, 1954), it tells us, in code, about the
character of our particular world. Apparently, the world
is made of a stuff that does not have “consequences” wait-
ing around to fulfill our “actions”—it is a world in which
the consequences are generated on the fly. One starts to
get a sense of a world picture that is part personal—truly
personal—and part the joint product of all that interacts.
This is a world of indeterminism, but one with no place
for “objective chance” in the sense of Lewis’ Principal
Principle (Harper, 2012; Lewis, 1986a). From within any
part, the future is undetermined. If one of those parts
is an agent, then it is an agent in a situation of uncer-
tainty. And where there is uncertainty, agents should use
the calculus of Bayesian probability in order to make the
best go at things.
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